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The monarchical principle in question: Hohenzollern state-building, conquest, and the 
locus of royal sovereignty in Prussia, 1815-1871 
 
Dr Jasper Heinzen, Department of History, University of York1 
 
Abstract: Since Bodin scholars have been debating whether sovereignty is indivisible or rather 
decentred, multiple and shared. This article adds to practice-oriented conceptualisations of 
sovereignty, which acknowledge the existence of jurisdictional pluralism in nineteenth-century state-
building. Borrowing from imperial history, it contrasts the nominal supremacy of the Prussian crown 
 W as embodied by the monarchical principle  W with the residual sovereign rights of potentates that 
had lost their lands in 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐƐuccessive wars of unification. The possession of  ‘ďĂƌĞƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ?
allowed such mediatised princes and exiled rulers to maintain a presence in the lives of their former 
subjects. They did so by exercising privileges and functions which left vague in whose name was 
being governed. The Hohenzollerns for their part struggled (and to a certain extent proved unwilling) 
to assert exclusive dominion because right of conquest-based justifications had no firm standing in 
international law, alienated segments of domestic public opinion and did not necessarily serve the 
interests of the state. The article argues, ultimately, that the resulting negotiation and contestation 
of monarchical sovereignty in Prussia speaks to global themes of state-building through state 
destruction in the Age of Empire. 
 
Five years before his death in 1881, the Swiss-German pioneer of international law Johann Kaspar 
Bluntschli published his thoughts on the genesis of the modern state. Summarising the intellectual 
yields of a fifty-year career, he posited in Lehre vom modernen Staat that sovereignty had become an 
exclusive good in the era of the nation-state. Unlike the Middle Ages, when monarchs had 
supposedly been the supreme proprietors of the whole land and subjects held their estates as fiefs, 
public law now adhered to the principle that the territory of a state was inalienable and indivisible. 
ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇŝƚǁĂƐ ‘ŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ to do as the mediaeval princes did, who sold, or pawned, or 
ƉĂƌƚŝƚŝŽŶĞĚƚŚĞŝƌĚŽŵĂŝŶƐĂƐƉŝĞĐĞƐŽĨƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ? ?2 This bold claim about the attainments of 
western civilisation seemed to be confirmed by the proliferation of international conventions like the 
1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law that recognised the sovereign character of signatory 
                                                             
1 I am grateful to Stuart Carroll, Jan Rybak, the anonymous reviewers and the co-editor of the Historical Journal, 
Sarah Pearsall, for their constructive feedback on earlier drafts of this article. Needless to say, all responsibility 
for remaining imperfections is my own. 
2 Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, The theory of the state [Lehre vom modernen Staat] (tr. Batoche Books, Kitchener, 
ON, 2000), pp. 202-3.  
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and acceding states.3 Yet what Bluntschli left unsaid was that the emerging frameworks of 
international law reinforced another mainstay of nineteenth-century political history: conquest. In an 
era of imperial expansion, treaties hid asymmetries of power by affirming the equality of victors and 
vanquished on a symbolic plane. European powers established protectorates around the globe, 
which left suzerainty nominally in the hands of the weaker party, because they appreciated the 
benefits of jurisdictional grey-zones. Partnering up with local rulers reduced the need for expensive 
garrisons of occupation, obviated international resistance to outright annexation and shored up the 
tenuous loyalties of new subjects.4  
   The contrast between the theory and practice of governance in the nineteenth century lends 
weight to recent efforts across different disciplines to rethink the plural and divisible applications of 
sovereignty as activity in relation to the unified and inseparable character of sovereignty as doctrine. 
The exercise of jurisdiction, James J. ^ŚĞĞŚĂŶƵƐĞĨƵůůǇƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? ‘ŝƐďĞƐƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚĂƐ
a set of claims made by those seeking or wielding power, claims about the superiority and autonomy 
of their authority. State making, therefore, is the ongoing process of making, unmaking, and revising 
ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶĐůĂŝŵƐ ? ?5 This injunction usefully highlights that even the most asymmetric transfers of 
sovereignty through conquest are ultimately incomplete. Consider in this context >ĂƵƌĞŶĞŶƚŽŶ ?Ɛ
claim that in relegating indigenous leaders to a place of liminality in the edifice of European empires, 
                                                             
3 Cf. Jan Martin >ĞŵŶŝƚǌĞƌ ?ƐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚĨƵůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞWĂƌŝƐĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ Power, law and the end of privateering 
(Basingstoke, 2014).  
4 JöƌŶ>ĞŽŶŚĂƌĚ ? ‘<ŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌƵŶĚƵƐďůŝĐŬ PWƌŽƚĞŬƚŝŽŶƵŶĚWƌŽƚĞŬƚŽƌĂƚĞŝŵůĂŶŐĞŶ ? ? ?:ĂŚƌŚƵŶĚĞƌƚ ‘ ?ŝŶdŝůŵĂŶ
Haug, Nadir Weber and Christian Windler (eds.), Asymmetrische politische Beziehungen zwischen Partnerschaft 
und Dominanz (16. bis frühes 20. Jahrhundert) (Cologne, 2016), pp. 445-50. Wolfgang Egner, Protektion und 
Souveränität: Die Entwicklung imperialer Herrschaftsformen und Legitimationsfiguren im 19. Jahrhundert 
(Berlin, 2018); Andrew Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, property and empire, 1500-2000 (Cambridge, 2014); Tanja 
Bührer, Flavio Eichmann, Stig Förster and Benedikt Stuchtey (eds.), Cooperation and empire: local realities of 
global processes (New York and Oxford, 2017);  ? ?^ ?tĂĚĞ ? ‘,ĂďĞĂƐŽƌƉƵƐ PŝƐĂƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ
ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ ? ? ?The Cambridge Law Journal 18:1 (1960), pp. 1-3. 
5 James J. ^ŚĞĞŚĂŶ ? ‘dŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ?American Historical Review, 111 (2006), 
p. 3. See also :ĞŶƐĂƌƚĞůƐŽŶ ? ‘KŶƚŚĞ indivisibility of sŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ? ?Republics of Letters, 2 (1 June 2011): 
http://rofl.stanford.edu/node/91; Gregor Feindt, Bernhard Gißibl and Johannes Paulmann (eds.), Kulturelle 
Souveränität: Politische Deutungs- und Handlungsmacht jenseits des Staates im 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 
 ? ? ? ? ) ?ĂŶĚtĞŶĐŬĞDĞƚĞůŝŶŐ ?ƐƐƵŵŵĂƌǇŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ‘dŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇĂŶĚŐůŽďĂůŝƐŵŝŶŵŽĚĞƌŶ
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ŚĞůĚĂƚƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶ,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞŝŶtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶŽŶ ? ?-23 March 2019, GHI Bulletin, 65 
(2019), pp. 139-45. 
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 ‘ ?ŝ ?ŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇ was being articulated as policy  W even as a core principle of an imperial law based 
ŽŶĚŝǀŝƐŝďůĞƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚ/ŶĚŝĂ ?6 In the words of one British government official 
from 1875, defining where a ruling prince merged into a British suďũĞĐƚĂƚƚŝŵĞƐƐĞĞŵĞĚ ‘ďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞ
ƉŽǁĞƌŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? ?ĞŶƚŽŶŶŽƚĞƐƚŚĂƚŝŶƐƵĐŚĂĨůƵŝĚĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƉĂƌĂŵŽƵŶƚĐǇƌĞƐŝĚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ
prerogative of the imperial power to decide when to let politics rather than the law speak. By the 
same token the colonial state could also decide not to intervene in the affairs of conquered 
grandees, thus ensuring that they ƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚĂŵŝŶŝŵĂůŝƐƚŽƌŶŽŵŝŶĂůŵŽĚŝĐƵŵŽĨ ‘ďĂƌĞƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ? ?7 
The choice to leave Indian princes with trappings of bare sovereignty coincided with a path-breaking 
transition in international law away from universal natural law towards a positivist concern with 
custom. Thus, whereas the older rhetoric of universalism presumed the existence of a higher 
morality in all civilisations and states, positivist legal frameworks required more culture-specific 
forms of consent.8  
   Benton insists that European polities also preserved  ‘ĂŶŽŵĂůŽƵƐĞŶĐůĂǀĞƐĂŶĚůŽŽƐĞůǇĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĞĚ 
ĐŽƌƌŝĚŽƌƐŽĨŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ?ǇĞƚƚŚŝƐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚĂůƚŽŚĞƌǁŽƌŬ ?ƵŝůĚŝŶŐŽŶ the 
historiographical convergence of German and global history in the last decade, this essay argues that 
Prussia, much like the maritime empires of Britain or France, experimented with sovereignty in the 
wake of conquest.9 Twice the Hohenzollerns made territorial gains by force in the period under 
investigation, first in 1815 when they absorbed the lands of mediatised princes and again in 1866 
                                                             
6 Lauren Benton, A search for sovereignty: law and geography in European empires, 1400-1900 (Cambridge, 
2010), p. 258. 
7 Ibid., pp. 256-60. See also Tanja BüŚƌĞƌ ? ‘ŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĂĚĂƉƚĂƚŝŽŶ PƌŝƚŝƐŚĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚƐĂƚƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚ
of the Nizam of Hyderabad, c. 1779- ? ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶBührer et al. (eds.), Cooperation and empire, pp. 90-114; Saliha 
Belmessous (ed.), Empire by treaty: negotiating European expansion, 1600-1900 (Oxford, 2015).  
8 Antony Anghie, Imperialism: sovereignty and the making of international law (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 41-3. See 
also Martti Koskenniemi, The gentle civilizer of nations: the rise and fall of international law 1870-1960 
(Cambridge, 2001), ch. 2.  
9 Benton, A search for sovereignty, pp. 279-80. Wolfgang Neugebauer, Wozu preußische Geschichte im 21. 
Jahrhundert? (Berlin, 2012), p. 58; Mark Hewitson, Germany and the modern world, 1880-1914 (Cambridge, 
2018); Jasper Heinzen, Making Prussians, raising Germans: a cultural history of Prussian state-building after 
civil war, 1866-1935 (CambriĚŐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌůĂƌŬ ? ‘ĨƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? PƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŝŶ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 22 (2012), pp. 171-97; Mark Tilse, Transnationalism 
in the Prussian east (Basingstoke, 2011); Sebastian Conrad, Globalisation and the nation in Imperial Germany 
(Cambridge, 2010); , ?'ůĞŶŶWĞŶŶǇ ? ‘'ĞƌŵĂŶƉŽůǇĐĞŶƚƌŝƐŵĂŶĚƚŚĞǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŽĨŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ?German History 30:2 
(2012), pp. 265-82.  
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when they ĂŶŶĞǆĞĚƐĞǀĞƌĂůŽĨƵƐƚƌŝĂ ?Ɛ north German allies. >ĞĂƌŶŝŶŐĨƌŽŵWƌƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐŽǁŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ
of defeat and occupation at the hands of Napoleonic France in 1806, reform-minded statesmen such 
as Reichsfreiherr Karl vom Stein and Prince Karl August von Hardenberg promoted an ideology of 
 ‘ĞŶůŝŐŚƚĞŶĞĚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ?ƚŚĂƚĂŝŵĞĚƚŽ ‘ƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůĞĂƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶŵŽŶĂƌĐŚ with a politically active 
ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƌǇ ? ?ĂƐDĂƚƚŚĞǁ>ĞǀŝŶŐĞƌŚĂƐƉƵƚ it. 10 Their proposed remedy for WƌƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛ heterogeneity was 
the development of a normative sphere where subjects could express concerns locally through 
consultative bodies in the expectation that the king would act as final arbiter. In this scenario the 
right to rule derived from an implicit social contract between the monarchy and the people.11 The 
revolutionary turmoil of 1848 broke down the last barriers to the establishment of a state parliament 
and even the promulgation of a constitution. While the granting of these concessions ĂƚƚŚĞŬŝŶŐ ?s 
pleasure was hardly exceptional (Louis XVIII had done the same when he issued the Charte 
constitutenelle upon his ascension to the French throne in 1814), historians have long debated 
whether the continuing affirmation of royal supremacy tempered ďǇ ‘ƐĞůĨ-ŝŵƉŽƐĞĚ ?ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŵĂĚĞ
WƌƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛconstitutional monarchy a distinctive, self-contained expression of sovereignty, or rather 
represented an intermediary stage on the road to parliamentary rule.12 Recent scholarship attests to 
overlapping sources of metajuridical authority that defy a clear-cut answer.13 Some historians, 
notably Frank-Lothar Kroll, see the expanding consultative role of parliament moving in step with 
other western European countries, even though ŽƵƚƌŝŐŚƚĂƉƉĞĂůƐƚŽ ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƌƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ?
                                                             
10 Matthew Levinger, Enlightened nationalism: the transformation of Prussian political culture (Oxford, 2000), p. 
261. 
11 Christopher Clark, dŝŵĞĂŶĚƉŽǁĞƌ PǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŽĨŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞdŚŝƌƚǇzĞĂƌƐ ?tĂƌƚŽƚŚĞ
Third Reich (Princeton, NJ, 2019), pp. 138-43. 
12 The literature on constitutionalism and Prusso-German parliamentary politics is extensive, but for a 
representative sample of the latest scholarship see Hans-ŚƌŝƐƚŽĨ<ƌĂƵƐ ? ‘ŝĞƉŽůŝƚŝƐĐŚĞEĞƵŽƌĚŶƵŶŐ
ĞƵƚƐĐŚůĂŶĚƐŶĂĐŚĚĞƌtĞŶĚĞǀŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶtŝŶĨƌŝĞĚ,ŝŶĞŵĂŶŶ ?>ŽƚŚĂƌ,öbelt and Ulrich Lappenküper (eds.), 
Der preußisch-österreichische Krieg 1866 (Paderborn, 2018), pp. 331-2;  Philipp Erbentraut, Theorie und 
Soziologie der politischen Parteien im deutschen Vormärz 1815-1848 (Tübingen, 2016). On the Huber-
Böckenförde Debate, which kick-started the original controversy, see Martin Kirsch, Monarch und Parlament im 
19. Jahrhundert: Der monarchische Konstitutionalismus als europäischer Verfassungstyp  W Frankreich im 
Vergleich (Göttingen, 1999), pp. 57-65. 
13 Cf. DĂƚƚŚĞǁ&ŝƚǌƉĂƚƌŝĐŬ ? ‘ƐƚĂƚĞof exception? Mass expulsions and the German constitutional state, 1871-
 ? ? ? ? ? ?Journal of Modern History, 85 (2013), pp. 772-800. 
5 
 
(Volkssouveränität) remained limited in German texts at the time.14 Alternative explanations that 
emphasise the persistence of royal hegemony meanwhile fall short where they measure the 
decisions of the crown by the standards of twenty-first century democracy, and naturally find them 
wanting.15   
   The present article proposes to re-ĞǆĂŵŝŶĞƚŚĞ,ŽŚĞŶǌŽůůĞƌŶĚǇŶĂƐƚǇ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŽůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉĨƌŽŵĂ
fresh angle. It does so by arguing that challenges to the monarchical before national unification in 
1871 did not only come from liberal demands for greater parliamentary agency but also the residual 
rights of mediatised and dethroned princes. The German Confederation was home to no fewer than 
14 reigning dynasties as well as about 100 lesser standesherrlich families.16 Many minor sovereigns 
had been unable to defend their autonomy against the shifting political tides of the Napoleonic Wars, 
a fate several of the remaining princes  W among them the king of Hanover, the elector of Hesse-
Kassel and the duke of Nassau  W were destined to share after picking the wrong side in the German 
civil war of 1866. Thomas Biskup and Martin Kohlrausch have therefore gone so far as to suggest that 
 ‘ĨŽƌ'ĞƌŵĂŶĚǇŶĂƐƚƐ ? ? ?ƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŵĂŶĂƚĞĚŶŽƚĨƌŽŵƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶďƵƚŽƚŚĞƌ'ĞƌŵĂŶ
ŵŽŶĂƌĐŚƐƚŚĂƚǁŝƐŚĞĚƚŽĚĞƉŽƐĞƚŚĞŵďǇĨŽƌĐĞ ? ?17 Yet, paradoxically, the losers of this power 
struggle were slow to lose their sovereign attributes. Amongst other privileges, Article 14 of the 1815 
'ĞƌŵĂŶ&ĞĚĞƌĂůĐƚĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚŵĞĚŝĂƚŝƐĞĚŚŽƵƐĞƐ ?ĚǇŶĂƐƚŝĐĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇǁŝƚŚƌĞŝŐŶŝŶŐŵŽŶĂƌĐŚƐĂŶĚ
permitted them to dispense various forms of local justice. Perhaps most tellingly, the Prussian crown 
                                                             
14 Frank-Lothar Kroll, Geburt der Moderne: Politik, Gesellschaft und Kultur vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg (Berlin, 
2013); pp. 11-22; Duncan Kelly,  ‘Popular sovereignty as state theory in the nineteenth ceŶƚƵƌǇ ? ?ŝŶZŝĐŚĂƌĚ
Bourke and Quentin Skinner (eds.), Popular sovereignty in historical perspective (Cambridge, 2016), p. 271. 
15 See, for instance, Hartwin Spenkuch, Preußen  W eine besondere Geschichte: Staat, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft 
und Kultur 1648-1947 (Göttingen, 2019), pp. 199-201. 
16 Dorothee Gottwald, Fürstenrecht und Staatsrecht im 19. Jahrhundert: Eine wissenschaftliche Studie 
(Frankfurt a. M., 2009), p. 32. For slightly diverging estimates, see Gollwitzer, Die Standesherren, p. 10 and 
Vahlteich, Die deutschen Standesherren: Ein Überblick über ihre Lage und Verhältnisse (Jena, 1844), pp. 12-15. 
17 dŚŽŵĂƐŝƐŬƵƉĂŶĚDĂƌƚŝŶ<ŽŚůƌĂƵƐĐŚ ? ‘ĂƐƌďĞĚĞƌDŽŶĂƌĐŚŝĞ PEĂĐŚǁŝƌŬƵngen einer deutschen 
Institution ‘ ?ŝŶŝĚĞŵ ?ĞĚƐ ? ) ?Das Erbe der Monarchie: Nachwirkungen einer deutschen Institution seit 1918 
(Frankfurt a. M., 2008), p. 25. 
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agreed to conclude a treaty with exiled King Georg V of Hanover in 1867 which provided for his 
material comfort without requiring him to renounce his sovereignty.18 
    The suspended state of animation of vanquished dynasts raises intriguing questions about the 
exercise of royal dominion. For example, it invites us to re-consider continuities in Prussian state-
building. Contemporary legal scholars and modern historians have so far stressed the fundamentally 
different politico-legal position of Standesherren and dethroned monarchs. They point to the fact 
that the two groups formed no common legal estate. Mediatised princes, writes Jonathan Spangler, 
ǁĞƌĞ ‘ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇŶŽďůĞŶŽƌƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐƌŽǇĂů ? ?19 The majority of these semi-royal grandees 
were prepared to recognise Hohenzollern overlordship in return for material compensation and 
social distinction, whereas fully royal exiles such as Georg V and Friedrich Wilhelm I of Hessen-Kassel 
steadfastly refused to enter into agreements that compromised their sovereign standing. Similarly, 
although European courts had no qualms about affirming the mediatisation of Standesherren at the 
Congress of Vienna in 1815, they felt conflicted about the dethronement of close relatives at the end 
of the Austro-Prussian War.20 Heinz Gollwitzer therefore concludes that instead of being natural 
allies, the losers of 1806 and 1866 remained too divided by history, international politics and even 
economic circumstances to find much common ground.21  
   The prevailing concern with difference occludes important connections between the two dynastic 
communities, however. Chief among them are their common origin. Prior to 1806, every prince 
                                                             
18 Torsten Riotte, Der Monarch im Exil: Eine andere Geschichte von Staatswerdung und Legitimismus im 19. 
Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 2018), p. 24. 
19 :ŽŶĂƚŚĂŶ^ƉĂŶŐůĞƌ ? ‘dŚŽƐĞŝŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ PƉƌŝŶĐĞůǇĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐŽŶƚŚĞŵĂƌŐŝŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ'ƌĞĂƚWŽǁĞƌƐ ?dŚĞ&ƌĂŶĐŽ-
'ĞƌŵĂŶĨƌŽŶƚŝĞƌ ? ?ŝŶŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌ, ?:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ ?ĂǀŝĚt ?^ĂďĞĂŶĂŶĚ^ŝŵŽŶdĞƵƐĐŚĞƌ ?ĞĚƐ ? ) ?Transregional and 
transnational families in Europe and beyond: experiences since the Middle Ages (New York and Oxford, 2011), 
p. 133. Cf. Willibald Steinmetz, Europa im 19. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt a. M, 2019), pp. 122-3; Heinrich Bernhard 
Oppenheim, System des Völkerrechts (Frankfurt a. M., 1845), p. 108.  
20 Cf. Jasper Heinzen,  ‘DŽŶĂƌĐŚŝĐĂůƐƚĂƚĞ-building through state destruction: Hohenzollern self-legitimization at 
ƚŚĞĞǆƉĞŶƐĞŽĨĚĞƉŽƐĞĚĚǇŶĂƐƚŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ<ĂŝƐĞƌƌĞŝĐŚ ? ?German History, 35 (2017), pp. 525-50.  
21 Heinz Gollwitzer, Die Standesherren: Die politische und gesellschaftliche Stellung der Mediatisierten 1815-
1918. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Sozialgeschichte (Göttingen, 19642), pp. 44, 147. One of the few group portraits 
of mediatised and deposed princely houses comes from the pen of the popular 1860s writer Louise Otto-
Peters, but due to its mass appeal this publication contains little analysis or indeed comparison. Louise Otto-
Peters, Geschichte mediatisirter deutscher Fürstenhäuser Hannover, Kurhessen, Nassau, Thurn und Taxis, 
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Hohenzollern-Hechingen, Ansbach, Baireuth und Arenberg (Leipzig, 1868). 
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belonged in principle to the high nobility [hohe Adel] that had a seat in the Imperial Diet and ruled 
over a territory that was only immediate unto the Holy Roman Empire.22 Power was dispersed in such 
a setting ? ‘hŶůŝŬĞŶĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?:ĂŵĞƐ: ?^ŚĞĞŚĂŶŚĂƐŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ? ‘ƚŚĞZĞŝĐŚĚŝĚŶŽƚŝŶƐŝƐƚƵƉŽŶ
pre-eminent authority and unquestioning allegiance. Its goal was not to clarify and dominate but 
rather to order and balance fragmented institutions and ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞůŽǇĂůƚŝĞƐ ? ?23 Despite the 
reformatory impulses of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, composite statehood 
remained an attractive model throughout central Europe, which both satisfied nostalgic longings for 
a return to pre-modern systems of order and responded to the eclecticism of new administrative 
structures.24 The ambitious Hohenzollerns were no less alive to the advantages than their Austrian 
competitors. For instance, when Prussia proceeded to digest the spoils of the Third Partition of 
Poland (1795), the authorities left the old municipal elites in post for a while because their continued 
presence made the rupture of regime change less apparent.25 That the illusion of an unbroken chain 
of monarchical dominion continued to preoccupy statesmen pointed to the universal utility of 
invented traditions but also meant  W to paraphrase the philosopher Robert Pogue Harrison  W that 
former rulers were fated to remain undead as long as their image survived.26 Put another way, where 
monarchs drew on the symbolic capital of their predecessors to navigate the fragmented legacy of 
conquest, sovereignty functioned as a shared resource. 
   This article contends that the Prussian  ‘ŵŽŶĂƌĐŚŝĐĂůƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?ŵĂƐŬĞĚfundamental insecurities 
about how to deal with holders of residual sovereignty. Constitutional theorists following in the 
                                                             
22 Gottwald, Fürstenrecht und Staatsrecht, p. 34. 
23 James J. Sheehan, German history 1770-1866 (Oxford, 1989), p. 14. Cf. Peter H. Wilson, The Holy Roman 
ŵƉŝƌĞ PĂƚŚŽƵƐĂŶĚǇĞĂƌƐŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ(London, 2016); Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman 
Empire  ? ?ǀŽůƐ ? ?KǆĨŽƌĚ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ŶĚƌĞĂƐKƐŝĂŶĚĞƌ ? ‘Sovereignty, international relations, and the Westphalian 
ŵǇƚŚ ? ?International Organization 55:2 (2001), pp. 251-87. 
24 On the relevance of early modern composite statehood traditions for nineteenth-century state-building, see 
Part 3 in Michael Broers and Ambrogio A. Caiani (eds.), A history of the European restorations: governments, 
states and monarchy (vol. 1, London, 2020); William D. Godsey, The sinews of Habsburg power: Lower Austria 
in a fiscal-military state 1650-1820 (Oxford, 2018). 
25 Helga Schnabel-SchüůĞ ? ‘,ĞƌƌƐĐŚĂĨƚƐǁĞĐŚƐĞů W zum Potential einer Forschungskategorie ‘ ?ŝŶĞĂĚĞŵĂŶĚ
Andreas Gestrich (eds.), Fremde Herrscher  W fremdes Volk: Inklusions- und Exklusionsfiguren bei 
Herrschaftswechseln in Europa (Frankfurt a. M., 2006), p. 16. 
26 Robert Pogue Harrison, The dominion of the dead (Chicago, IL, 2003), pp. 147-8. 
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footsteps of Jean Bodin argued that if sovereignty was indivisible, as they believed, it should be 
vested exclusively in the executive branch of government headed by the crown. But how was the 
case for a strong monarchy to be made by princes who sought to extend their power at the expense 
of peers? The fact that many states had secured territory through conquest during the Napoleonic 
Wars and at the Congress of Vienna only steeled the determination of the surviving monarchs to 
defend their possessions. The Final Act of the Vienna ŽŶŐƌĞƐƐƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵĞĚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐĐƌŽǁŶĞĚŚĞĂĚƐ
ƚŚĞĐĂƌƌŝĞƌƐŽĨ ‘ĂůůƐƚĂƚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ? ?gesamte Staatsgewalt) in their domains in 1815. 27 At the same 
time mediatised princes retained pretensions to independent authority in certain areas, and 
legitimists warned ƚŚĂƚĂŶǇƵŶŝůĂƚĞƌĂůĚŝƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƌƵůĞƌƐ ?ƉĂƚƌŝŵŽŶǇĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĞǀĞƌǇŝĚĞĂŽĨ
sovereignty, since each side was left in possession of some attributes. The ambiguity which was thus 
introduced into the legal idea and exercise of the monarchical principle took decades to resolve. 
/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ƚŚĞWƌƵƐƐŝĂŶĐƌŽǁŶ ?ƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞStandesherren lasted long enough to still be in 
progress by the time the government proceeded to absorb the thrones conquered in 1866, which 
offers a final reason for why the two groups of toppled sovereigns merit study not apart but 
together.  
   ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐĨĞĚĞƌĂůŚĞƌŝƚĂŐĞŝŶǀĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĞƌĞƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇƌĞƐŝĚĞĚǁŝƚŚ
unrivalled complexity vis-à-vis more centrally governed nations, the issues that the Hohenzollerns 
and their detractors grappled with tapped into wider currents of political transformation and re-
alignment since the French Revolution. Just as aristocrats at large shifted their ethos from 
seigneurialism to an emphasis on service to the state, so, too, monarchs - reigning or otherwise  W had 
                                                             
27 ,ĂƌƚǁŝŶ^ƉĞŶŬƵĐŚ ? ‘sĞƌŐůĞŝĐŚƐǁĞŝƐĞďĞƐŽŶĚĞƌƐ ?Politisches System und Strukturen Preußens als Kern des 
 “ĚĞƵƚƐĐŚĞŶ^ŽŶĚĞƌǁĞŐƐ “ ‘ ?Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 29 (2003), pp. 272-4; Otto BƌƵŶŶĞƌ ? ‘sŽŵ
Gottesgnadentum zum monarchischen Prinzip: Der Weg der europäischen Monarchie seit dem hohen 
DŝƚƚĞůĂůƚĞƌ ‘ ?ŝŶDas Königtum: Seine geistigen und rechtlichen Grundlagen (Lindau and Constance, 1956), pp. 
279- ? ? ? ?KƚƚŽ,ŝŶƚǌĞ ? ‘ĂƐŵŽŶĂƌĐŚŝƐĐŚĞWƌŝŶǌŝƉƵŶĚĚŝĞŬŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĞůůĞsĞƌĨĂƐƐƵŶŐ ? ?Preußische Jahrbücher, 
144 (1911), pp. 381-412; ĚƵĂƌĚ,ƵďƌŝĐŚ ? ‘ĂƐŵŽŶĂƌĐŚŝƐĐŚĞWƌŝŶǌŝƉŝŶWƌĞƵƘĞŶ ? ?Zeitschrift für Politik 1 (1908), 
pp. 193- ? ? ? ?KŶŽĚŝŶ ?ƐůŽŶŐ-term impact on German political philosophy, see the last three chapters in 
Michael Philipp (ed.), Debatten um die Souveränität: Jean Bodins Staatsverständnis und seine Rezeption seit 
dem 17. Jahrhundert (Baden-Baden, 2016). On the monarchocentric set-up of the German Confederation, see 
ChristopŚĞƌůĂƌŬ ? ‘'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ? ? ?-1848: restoration or Pre-DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ?ŝŶDĂƌǇ&ƵůďƌŽŽŬ ?ĞĚ ? ) ?German history 
since 1800 (New York, 1997), pp. 39-44.  
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to justify their leadership ŝŶŶŽǀĞůǁĂǇƐƚŚĂƚƚŽŽŬĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐŶĞĞĚƐŝŶĂŶĞƌĂŽĨďƵƌŐĞŽŶŝŶŐ
nationalism and proliferating constitutions.28 How these objectives were to be met remained a bone 
of contention. In exploring the competition of the Hohenzollerns and rival sovereigns for power, 
money and legitimacy, the article foregrounds the disorientation wrought by the nineteenth-
ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?ƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞƐĂŶĚƌĞĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨůŽǇĂůƚŝĞƐ ?tŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƐŚŽƌƚƐƉĂĐĞŽĨƐĞǀĞŶƚǇǇĞĂƌƐ
the region that would become the German Empire evolved from a porous conglomerate of semi-
autonomous bodies, specially defined communities and Länder peculiar unto themselves into a 
nation-state with relatively uniform boundaries, law codes and political institutions.29  
   The nineteenth-ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?Ɛbetwixt-and-between condition is elegantly captured by the Marxist 
ƉŚƌĂƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŶŽŶ-ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐ ? ?30 Uneven socio-political reforms and fractures 
ŝŶůŝǀĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚƚŝŵĞůĂŐƐŝŶĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌŝĞƐ ?ĂĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞsocial, political and 
technological transformations unfolding around them. Read one way, the insistence of 
Standesherren and exiled monarchs on entitlements and exemptions outside the constitutional rights 
granted to ordinary subjects marked these individuals as ancien régime hold-outs destined to 
succumb to the twin pressures of bureaucratic rationalisation and national integration.31 Measured 
by their own standards, however, the dispossessed and their Hohenzollern competitors negotiated 
discrete visions of modernity in putting forward claims to sovereign status. For all their innate 
conservatism, King Georg V and Elector Friedrich Wilhelm I had no qualms about appealing to public 
                                                             
28 Cf. William D. Godsey, Nobles and nation in central Europe: free imperial knights in the Age of Revolution, 
1750-1850  ?ĂŵďƌŝĚŐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?WŝĞƌĂŶŐĞůŽ^ĐŚŝĞƌĂ ? ‘ƵƌŽƉćŝƐĐŚĞƐsĞƌĨĂƐƐƵŶŐƐĚĞŶŬĞŶ ? ? ? ? ?-1847: Die 
Zentralität der Legislativgewalt zwischen monarchischem Prinzip und Legitimität ‘ ?ŝŶtĞƌŶĞƌĂƵŵĞƚĂů ?(eds.), 
Handbuch der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert: Institutionen und Rechtspraxis im 
gesellschaftlichen Wandel (vol. 2, Bonn, 2012), pp. 165-208, esp. 168-75.  
29 On these changes, see Sheehan, German history, pp. 24-5; William W. Hagen, German history in modern 
times: four lives of the nation (Cambridge, 2012), parts 1 and 2; John Breuilly (ed.), Nineteenth-century 
Germany: politics, culture and society (London and New York, 2001); Helmuth W. Smith (ed.), The Oxford 
handbook of modern German history (Oxford, 2011). 
30 Cf. Ernst ůŽĐŚ ? ‘EŽŶƐǇŶĐŚƌŽŶŝƐŵĂŶĚƚŚĞŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŝƚƐĚŝĂůĞĐƚŝƐ ? ?New German Critique, 11 (1977), pp. 22-
38; Johannes ZŽŚƌďĞĐŬ ? ‘ZĞŚĂďŝůŝƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?ŝŶWĞƚĞƌ<ŽƐůŽǁƐŬŝ ?ĞĚ ? ) ?The discovery of 
historicity in German Idealism and Historism (Berlin, 2005), pp. 187-211; esp. 196-9; Hanns-Georg Brose, 
 ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ PƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂĐƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨŶŽŶ-sŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŝƚǇ ? ? ?Time and Society, 13 (2004), pp. 5- ? ? ? ? 
31 See ŵďƌŽŐŝŽ ?ĂŝĂŶŝ ?ƐƐƚŝŵƵůĂƚŝŶŐƚĂŬĞŽŶƚŚĞůŝŵŝƚƐĂŶĚƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨ the conservative imaginary in 
 ‘ZĞǀŝƐŝƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŶĐŝĞŶZĠŐŝŵĞŝŶƉost-Napoleonic ƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?European History Quarterly, 47 (2017), pp. 437-60. 
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opinion for quasi-plebiscitary support. Conversely, the Prussian government blended pre-1789 
unĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐŽĨƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇĂƐĚŝƐƉŽƐĂďůĞĐƌŽǁŶƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇǁŝƚŚ ‘ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ?ƉƌŽŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚƐŽŶ
national interest and the right of the German nation to be unified.  
   To capture the protean character of sovereignty, the first part of this article sets out the 
constitutional significance of the monarchical principle and the risks emanating from enforced 
ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƐŽĨƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƉŽǁĞƌ ?/ŶĂƐĞĐŽŶĚƐƚĞƉƚŚĞWƌƵƐƐŝĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽƌĞĂĐŚ
independent settlements with the Standesherren and deposed monarchs will be discussed before 
concluding with some broader reflections on monarchical state-building in Prussia. This undertaking 
will centre primarily ŽŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚŚĂůĨŽĨƚŚĞŶŝŶĞƚĞĞŶƚŚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇƉƌŝŽƌƚŽ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ
from a federation of states into a Prussian-dominated federal state in 1871, which curtailed  W though 
not eliminated  W opportunities for the display of alternative forms of sovereignty.32  
 
                                                                                         I 
An early point of orientation for debates about royal sovereignty in Prussia was the monarchical 
principle. This legal fiction gained popularity in response to the violence unleashed by the French 
Revolution, which pitted new visions of popular sovereignty against older models of enlightened 
absolutism. The persisting tension between these two sources of legitimacy made conservatives and 
moderate liberals eager to eliminate all potential for further instability. Adopting a term coined by 
Friedrich Schlegel in 1804/6, they agreed to recognise in the king the sovereign representative of the 
state but concomitantly avoided explicit statements on whether his authority derived from the will of 
God or a social contract with his subjects.33 Even when King Friedrich Wilhelm IV issued a 
constitution, the question remained subject to different interpretations. /ŶDŝĐŚĂĞů^ƚŽůůĞŝƐ ?
estimation, ƚŚĞ ‘ůĞŐĂůŐĞŶŝƵƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŵŽŶĂƌĐŚŝĐĂůƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞlay precisely in this ambiguity, which solved 
                                                             
32Frank Lorenz Müller ? ‘dŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶmŽŶĂƌĐŚŝĞƐ ? ?ŝŶDĂƚƚŚĞǁ:ĞĨĨĞƌŝĞƐ ?ĞĚ ? ) ?The Ashgate companion to 
Imperial Germany  ?&ĂƌŶŚĂŵ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?ZŝĐŚĂƌĚŝĞƚƌŝĐŚ ? ‘&ŽĞĚĞƌĂůŝƐŵƵƐ ?hŶŝƚĂƌŝƐŵƵƐŽĚĞƌ
,ĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĂůƐƚĂĂƚ ? ?ŝŶKƐǁĂůĚ^ƉĞŶŐůĞƌ ?ĞĚ ? ) ?ƵƌWƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝŬ ‘WƌĞƵƘĞŶƵŶĚĚĂƐZĞŝĐŚ ? (Cologne and Vienna, 
1984), pp. 49 W81. 
33 ƌƵŶŶĞƌ ? ‘sŽŵ'ŽƚƚĞƐŐŶĂĚĞŶƚƵŵǌƵŵŵŽŶĂƌĐŚŝƐĐŚĞŶWƌŝŶǌŝƉ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?
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certain conflicts and shrouded others.34 Indeed, from early on the preeminent philosopher G.W.F. 
Hegel propagated the creed ƚŚĂƚWƌƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛhereditary rulers were arbiters of a free, rationally ordered 
society.35 The conservative politician Friedrich Julius Stahl would further expand on the purpose of 
the monarchical principle with a famous treatise some three decades later. Like some members of 
<ŝŶŐ&ƌŝĞĚƌŝĐŚtŝůŚĞůŵ/s ?ƐĐŽƵƌƚ ?ƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŽĨDas monarchische Princip (1845) recognised that the 
ŚĞǇĚĂǇŽĨ ‘ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞŵŽŶĂƌĐŚǇ ?had passed. He nevertheless wished to preserve the unitary character 
of sovereignty lest other branches of government hold the executive to ransom and thereby force 
the monarchy to abandon its balancing role in society.36 ^ƚĂŚů ?ƐĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŝŶĨĂǀŽƵr of 
monarchical rule went hand in hand with a desire for ĂƐǇŵďŝŽƚŝĐƵŶŝŽŶŽĨĐŚƵƌĐŚĂŶĚƐƚĂƚĞ ?^ƚĂŚů ?Ɛ
ŝĚĞĂůŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƉůĂǇĞĚstraight to the mystical bent of Friedrich Wilhelm IV, Georg V of 
Hanover, and many fellow rulers, who, to varying degrees, maintained a belief in the divine origins of 
their office.37 Later in the century Kaiser Wilhelm II would take the eschatological legitimisation of 
ŬŝŶŐƐŚŝƉƚŽŶĞǁĞǆƚƌĞŵĞƐďǇƐƚǇůŝŶŐŚŝŵƐĞůĨ'ŽĚ ?ƐŵĞĚŝƵŵŽŶĞĂƌƚŚĂŶĚex officio blessed with the 
gift of clairvoyance.38    
   To be sure, the practical implementation of the monarchical principle ran into a number of 
difficulties. For a start, the fear of revolution and the very real upheavals of 1848 deterred 
                                                             
34 Michael Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland (vol. 2, Munich, 1992), p. 104. 
35 Ĩ ?ĞƌŶĂƌĚzĂĐŬ ? ‘dŚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇŽĨ,ĞŐĞů ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨŵŽŶĂƌĐŚǇ ? ?American Political Science Review, 74 
(1980), pp. 709-20, esp. 717; Wolfgang Reinhard, Geschichte der Staatsgewalt: Eine vergleichende 
Verfassungsgeschichte Europas von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (Munich, 1999), pp. 426-7; Markus J. 
WƌƵƚƐĐŚ ? ‘ “DŽŶĂƌĐŚŝĐĂůĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ?ŝŶƉost-Napoleonic Europe: concept and pƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ?ŝŶ<ĞůůǇ> ?'ƌŽƚŬĞ
and Markus J. Prutsch (eds), Constitutionalism, legitimacy, and power (Oxford, 2014), pp. 69-83. 
36 Friedrich Julius Stahl, Das monarchische Princip: Eine staatsrechtlich-politische Abhandlung (Heidelberg, 
1845); Thomas Nipperdey, Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck 1800-1866 (tr. Daniel Nolan, Dublin, 1996), pp. 
335-6; DĂƌŬ,ĞǁŝƚƐŽŶ ? ‘ ?dŚĞŽůĚĨŽƌŵƐĂƌĞďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐƵƉ ? ?ŽƵƌŶĞǁ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇŝƐƌĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐŝƚƐĞůĨ ? P
constitutionalism, nationalism and the creation of a German polity during the revolutions of 1848- ? ? ? ?English 
Historical Review, 125 (2010), p. 1188. 
37 David E. Barclay, Frederick William IV and the Prussian monarchy, 1840-1861 (Oxford, 1995); Dieter Brosius, 
 ‘'ĞŽƌŐs ?ǀŽŶ,ĂŶŶŽǀĞƌ W ĚĞƌ<ƂŶŝŐĚĞƐ “ŵŽŶĂƌĐŚŝƐĐŚĞŶWƌŝŶǌŝƉƐ ? ? ?Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch 51 (1979), pp. 
253-91; Christiane Wolf,  ‘ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŵŽŶĂƌĐŚǇŝŶůĂƚĞŶŝŶĞƚĞĞŶƚŚĂŶĚĞĂƌůǇƚǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚ-century, 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ĂŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂ ? ?ŝŶ>ĂƵƌĞŶĐĞCole and Daniel L. Unowsky (eds.), The limits of loyalty: imperial 
symbolism, popular allegiances, and state patriotism in the Late Habsburg Monarchy (New York and Oxford, 
2007), p. 213. 
38 John C. G. Röhl, Wilhelm II. (Munich, 2013), pp. 31-2. 
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conservatives from insisting too hard on the supreme will of the monarch. For all its pandering to the 
executive powers of the king, for instance, the Prussian constitution of 1850 (which remained in 
force with modifications until 1918) broke with precedent because it did not explicitly identify the 
crown as the holder all public authority. Moreover, Articles 62, 64 and 99 vested in parliament a joint 
right with the crown to initiate and pass legislation and to approve the governmental budget. From 
this moment at the latest it became difficult to argue that the Prussian monarch ruled alone.39 
Finally, the monarchical principle clashed with the burgeoning drive for national unification. The fact 
that the sovereignty of the 39 members of the German Confederation was theoretically absolute 
excluded the possibility of a nation-state to whom citizens owed primary allegiance. A commentary 
published in 1853 by the Göttingen historian and politician Georg Waitz went so far as to suggest 
that naƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚƐ ?ďŝĚƚŽďƌŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶƵŶŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŚĂĚďĞĞŶĚŽŽŵĞĚ
to failure because monarchical and national sovereignty cancelled each other out.40   
   Despite these concerns, however, the moŶĂƌĐŚŝĐĂůƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?ƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ on the sovereign 
individuality of the king remained topical. Hermann Wagener, the editor the conservative flagship 
newspaper Die Kreuzzeitung and the Neue Conversations-Lexikon, admonished his readers that the 
state was akin to a family with a royal patriarch at its head. To remain impartial and decisive in his 
actions, the father-monarch could not submit to anyone above or recognise co-sovereign institutions 
beside him. By the same token Wagener felt that popular sovereignty, as embodied by parliament, 
introduced divisions into political life, benefited certain groups but not society in its entirety. Worse, 
infighting laid a country open to foreign meddling and fuelled wide-spread discontent for would-be 
dictators to feed off.  ,ĞƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŽƉŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘Śereditary monarchieƐ ?ǁĞƌĞƚŚĞďĞƐƚĨŽƌŵŽf 
government 
 ‘ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ everything is set up like in bourgeois familial patriarchates; the son follows 
the profession of the father and takes over his dominion [Herrschaft] without giving 
                                                             
39 ,ĂŶƐŽůĚƚ ? ‘ŝĞƉƌĞƵƘŝƐĐŚĞsĞƌĨĂƐƐƵŶŐǀŽŵ ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌ ? ? ?  PWƌŽďůĞŵĞŝŚƌĞƌ/ŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft. Sonderheft, 6 (1980), p. 225. 
40 ŝĞƚĞƌ'ƌŝŵŵ ? ‘tĂƐƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶŵƉŝƌĞĂƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?ŝŶ^ǀĞŶKůŝǀĞƌDƺůůĞƌĂŶĚŽƌŶĞůŝƵƐdŽƌƉ ?ĞĚƐ ? ) ?
Imperial Germany revisited: continuing debates and new perspectives (New York, 2011), pp.56-7. 
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anyone cause to feel envy. By keeping ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ůŽĨƚǇĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĐŚĞĐŬŽŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨ
the unattainability of the highest office for them, the hereditary monarchy alone can 
ĨƵůĨŝůƚŚĞŵĂŶĚĂƚĞŽĨŵŽŶĂƌĐŚǇ ? ? ?ĂŶĚďƌŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƉĞĂĐĞĨor the state, in which 
people will not compete with each other for power and dominion but wrestle with 
ŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐŶĂƚƵƌĂůĨŽƌĐĞƐĨŽƌŚĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐĂŶĚŵŽƌĂůƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?41 
There can be no doubt that WaŐĞŶĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŽŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌďƌĂŶĚŽĨĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝƐŵ
that was fashionable at court and certain aristocratic circles at the time, but some of his ideas tapped 
into wider intellectual currents. Carl von Rotteck, an influential liberal activist in the Pre-March 
period, concurred with his political opponent that a constitutional king had the necessary clout to 
offset  ‘ƐĐŚĞŵŝŶŐ ĐŽƵƌƚŝĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉŽǁĞƌ-ŚƵŶŐƌǇŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ?.42 In fact, it is telling that repeated attempts 
between 1848 and 1863 to introduce legal ministerial responsibility in the second chamber of the 
Prussian Landtag failed in part because parliamentarians accepted that impeachment would have 
ŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞŬŝŶŐ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĐŚŽŽƐĞ(and dismiss) his ministers.43  
    tĞŐĞŶĞƌ ?ƐƌƵŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞƉĞƌƚŝŶĞŶƚĨŽƌƚǁŽƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ?&ŝƌƐƚůǇ ?ƚŚĞǇbear testament to the challenge 
contemporaries faced in conceptualising Herrschaft as plural and contested. The existence of 
multiple claimants, Wegener counselled, merely exacerbated political strife. Secondly, to function 
effectively, ĂĚǇŶĂƐƚǇ ?ƐŚŽůĚŽŶƚŚĞƚŚƌŽŶĞŚĂĚƚŽďĞƐĞĐƵƌĞůĞƐƚƚŚĞŵŽŶĂƌĐŚǇďĞĐŽŵĞwhat it was 
meant to forestall, a source of instability and factionalism. But what perhaps stood out most about 
the monarchical principle was the blatant discrepancy between its legitimism (which is to say the 
belief that heredity invested dynasties with the right to rule over a particular territory in perpetuity) 
                                                             
41 Hermann Wagener, Neues Conversations-Lexikon: Staats- und Gesellschafts-Lexikon (vol. 13, Berlin, 1863), p. 
538. On the function and uses of political lexicons in this period, see Hans-ŚƌŝƐƚŽĨ<ƌĂƵƐ ? ‘WĂƌůĂŵĞŶƚĞƵŶĚ
Parteien in liberalen und konservativen deutschen Staatslexika des 19. :ĂŚƌŚƵŶĚĞƌƚƐ ‘ ?Zeitschrift für Neuere 
Rechtsgeschichte, 40 (2018), pp. 16-26. On WaŐĞŶĞƌ ?ƐĐĂƌĞĞƌǁŝƚŚƚŚĞKreuzzeitung, see Dagmar Bussiek,  ‘Dŝƚ
Gott füƌ<ƂŶŝŐƵŶĚsĂƚĞƌůĂŶĚ ? ‘ PŝĞEĞƵĞWƌĞƵßische Zeitung (Kreuzzeitung) 1848-1892 (Münster, 2000), pp. 58-
74. 
42 <ĂƌůǀŽŶZŽƚƚĞĐŬ ? ‘DŽŶĂƌĐŚŝĞ ‘ ?ŝn idem and Carl Theodor Welcker (eds.), Staats-Lexikon oder Enzyklopädie der 
Staatswissenschaften (vol. 10, Altona, 1840), pp. 676-7. 
43 ƌŝĐŚ,ĂŚŶ ? ‘DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŝĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚŝŵƉĞĂĐŚŵĞŶƚŝŶWƌƵƐƐŝĂ ? ? ? ?-  ? ? ?Central European History, 10 
(1977), pp. 25-6; Marita Krauss, Herrschaftspraxis in Bayern und Preußen im 19. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt a. M., 
1997), pp. 101-2. 
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ĂŶĚƚŚĞǀĂŐĂƌŝĞƐŽĨƌĂŝƐŽŶĚ ?ĠƚĂƚ ?ǁĂƌĂŶĚ great power politics. Conquest was very much part of this 
matrix, as were the complex ethical and legal issues it raised.  
   One scholar who was not afraid to probe the contradictions of  ‘ƐƚĂƚĞ-building through state 
ĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? in the 1860s was Friedrich Brockhaus, a young lecturer at the University of Jena who also 
happened to be the grandson of the eponymous publisher and a nephew of Richard Wagner.44 In an 
illuminating 330-page study on the pitfalls of non-consensual power grabs, he courageously pointed 
out that nearly all ruling dynasties had despoiled fellow princes during their rise to the top. He 
therefore asked: was the legitimacy of German monarchs since 1815 inviolable, as Art. 54 of the Final 
Act of the Congress of Vienna seemed to imply, or could might be made right if victims accepted 
material compensation, other states recognised the fait accompli or subjects approved of the regime 
change? Even the warlike dissolution of the German Confederation in 1866 and the attendant 
annulment of the Final Act did not settle the issue for Brockhaus. He refused to condone the 
proposition that dynastic ownership could be terminated by a quick flick of the pen. To his mind 
monarchical sovereignty was neither dependent on popular acclamation, since the legitimate officer-
holder could veto any decision inimical to his interests, nor could it be taken away from the crown 
through an act of enforced self-destruction.45 To give regime change a maximum degree of 
legitimacy, the cooperation of the dethroned ruler was necessary, either in the shape of voluntary 
abdication or  ‘ƚĂĐŝƚƌĞůŝŶƋƵŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ? ?46 He finished on a re-assuring note for the Prussian government, 
however, by insisting that subjects owed their sovereign obedience so as not to jeopardise the 
                                                             
44 KŶƚŚĞƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶŽĨĚǇŶĂƐƚŝĐ ‘ƐƚĂƚĞ-ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƐƚĂƚĞĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ƐĞĞŝĞƚĞƌ>ĂŶŐĞǁŝĞƐĐŚĞ ?Die 
Monarchie im Jahrhundert Europas: Selbstbehauptung durch Wandel im 19. Jahrhundert (Heidelberg, 2013), p. 
7.  
45 Friedrich Brockhaus, Das Legitimitätsprincip: Eine staatsrechtliche Abhandlung (Leipzig, 1868), pp. 270-83. 
Note that Brockhaus based some of his arguments on Heinrich Zoepfl and H. A. Zachariae, who defended the 
interests of the Standesherren and Georg V of Hanover. 
46 Ibid., p. 277. 
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integrity of the state itself. Without an army, ƉƌĞƚĞŶĚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞƐŝŵƉůǇ ‘ŝƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚŝŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁ ?
(völkerrechtlich indifferent).47  
   dŽƉƵƚƌŽĐŬŚĂƵƐ ?ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ in perspective, better known constitutional theorists than him have 
grappled with conquest or the transfer of sovereignty in their models of the state. Thomas Hobbes 
tried and arguably failed with his theorem ŽĨ ‘ĚĞƐƉŽƚŝĐĂůĚŽŵŝŶŝŽŶ ? based on enforced consent, 
whose contradictions have made at least one critic fear for the coherence of Leviathan.48 Carl Schmitt 
would still concede three hundred years later ŝŶĂŶŽĚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚĂƚĞŽĨĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?:  ‘dŚĞŵĞƚŚŽĚƐŽĨ
empty normative generalizations are indicative in their deceptive abstractness, because they 
fundamentally disregard all concrete spatial viewpoints when considering a typical spatial problem 
ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?49 The next section will delve into how the Prussian crown responded to 
ƚŚĞƐĞ ‘ĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞƐƉĂƚŝĂůǀŝĞǁƉŽŝŶƚƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĚealings with mediatised princes 
 
                                                                                      II 
The territorial reorganisation of the former Holy Roman Empire in 1803/6 affected a sizeable number 
of families with varying pretensions to sovereign status. In addition to the 100 or imperial princes 
and counts that would become Standesherren, 350 clans belonging to the lesser estate of free 
imperial knights were absorbed by larger neighbouring states against their will.50 In Prussia alone, the 
former lands of the Standesherren amounted to 100 square miles and were home to 400,000 
inhabitants by the 1850s.51 Although their prestige was premised on only having owed fealty to the 
Holy Roman Empire prior to mediatisation, the liberties, financial circumstances and political clout of 
                                                             
47 Ibid., p. 323. KŶƚŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞƐĞĞĂůƐŽƚŚĞďŽŽŬƌĞǀŝĞǁďǇ ‘&ƌŝĐŬĞƌ ?ŝŶ ƚŚĞZeitschrift für die gesamte 
Staatswissenschaft, 25 (1869), pp. 184-5. 
48 dŚŽŵĂƐ,ŽďďĞƐ ? ‘KĨĚŽŵŝŶŝŽŶƉĂƚĞƌŶĂů ?ĂŶĚĚĞƐƉŽƚŝĐĂů ? ?ŝŶLeviathan (ed. J. C. A. Gaskin, Oxford, 1996), pp. 
132-9; Charles D. Tarlton,  ‘ ?dŽĂǀŽŝĚƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƚƌŽŬĞŽĨĚĞĂƚŚ ? PĚĞƐƉŽƚŝĐĂůĚŽŵŝŶŝŽŶ ?ĨŽƌĐĞ ?ĂŶĚůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇŝŶ
,ŽďďĞƐ ?ƐLeviathan ? ?Philosophy, 74 (1999), p. 225.   
49 Carl Schmitt, The nomos of the earth in the international law of the jus publicum europaeum (tr. G. L. Ulmen, 
New York, 2003), p. 193. 
50 For slightly lower estimates, see Gollwitzer, Die Standesherren, p. 10 and Vahlteich, Die deutschen 
Standesherren: Ein Überblick über ihre Lage und Verhältnisse (Jena, 1844), pp. 12-15. 
51 Carl Heiner Beusch ? ‘tĞƐƚĨćůŝƐĐŚĞ^ƚĂŶĚĞƐŚĞƌƌĞŶ PŝĞ&ƺƌƐƚĞŶǀŽŶĞŶƚŚĞŝŵ-Tecklenburg im 19. 
:ĂŚƌŚƵŶĚĞƌƚ ‘ ?Westfälische Zeitschrift 145 (1995), p. 267. 
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individual standesherrlich families varied greatly across the German Confederation. Debts resulting 
from diminished resources had forced some of the minor potentates to give up their independence 
in all but name long before the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, whereas others could boast 
enormous wealth  W such as the princes of Thurn and Taxis  W and ties ƚŽƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐƉƌĞŵŝĞƌƌŽǇĂů
dynasties like the princes of Leiningen.52  
   Standesherren may have constituted a heterogeneous group, but they nevertheless exhibited 
common traits which delineated them from the lower nobility. For one, their continuing dynastic 
equality with ruling families held out the possibility  W at least in theory  W of their return to power 
either through marriage or election to foreign thrones. TŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛďrief nomination of 
Prince Ernst Leopold von Leiningen for the Greek crown in 1863 demonstrated the potential of their 
privileged position.53 Another similarity in lifestyle mediatised shared with ruling princes were their 
cosmopolitan family networks. They often possessed estates in several states and made a habit of 
cultivating loyalties to more than one nation, as the example of the Anglo-Dutch-German Bentincks 
and the ancient Franco-Belgian-German House of Croÿ bears out.54 Some Standesherren like the 
princes of Hohenlohe and Wied even became part of the rarefied social circles that connected 
European royalty.55 The Federal Act of 1815 was responsive enough to these unique circumstances to 
permit Standesherren to choose their abode freely within the German Confederation and to enter 
the service of foreign nations.56 Other privileges included exemption from direct taxation and military 
                                                             
52 Frank <ůĞŝŶĞŚĂŐĞŶďƌŽĐŬ ? ‘ůƚĞZĞĐŚƚĞŝŶŶĞƵĞŶ^ƚĂĂƚĞŶ ?Reichsrecht, Bundesrecht und die Standesherren im 
Süden und EŽƌĚǁĞƐƚĞŶĞƵƚƐĐŚůĂŶĚƐ ?, in Matthias Asche, Thomas Nicklas, and Matthias Stickler (ed.), Was 
ǀŽŵůƚĞŶZĞŝĐŚĞďůŝĞď ? PĞƵƚƵŶŐĞŶ ?/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĞŶƵŶĚŝůĚĞƌĚĞƐĨƌƺŚŶĞƵǌĞŝƚůŝĐŚĞŶ,ĞŝůŝŐĞŶZƂŵŝƐĐŚĞŶZĞŝĐŚĞƐ
Deutscher Nation im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Munich, 2011), p. 308; Eva-Carolina Doll, Handlungsstrukturen: 
Die Standesherrschaft Thurn und Taxis in der Epochenschwelle zum 19. Jahrhundert unter Fürst Maximilian Karl 
(Regensburg, 2017); DŽŶŝŬĂtŝĞŶĨŽƌƚ ? ‘ĚůŝŐĞ,ĂŶĚůƵŶŐƐƐƉŝĞůƌäume und neue Adelstypen in der  “ŬůĂƐƐŝƐĐŚĞŶ
DŽĚĞƌŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?-   ? ? ) ? ?Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 33 (2007), pp. 421-2.  
53 Queen Victoria to Lord Russell, 8 February 1863, in The letters of Queen Victoria (ed. George Earle Buckle, 
second series, vol. 1, London, 1926), p. 63. 
54 On these coƐŵŽƉŽůŝƚĂŶĚǇŶĂƐƚŝĐĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƐĞĞ^ƉĂŶŐůĞƌ ? ‘dŚŽƐĞŝŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ?tŝůůŝĂŵ ?'ŽĚƐĞǇĂŶĚ
Veronika Hyden-Hanscho (eds.), Das Haus Arenberg und die Habsburgermonarchie: Eine transterritoriale 
Adelsfamilie zwischen Fürstendienst und Eigenständigkeit (16.-20. Jahrhundert) (Regensburg, 2019); Marie zu 
Erbach-Schönberg, Aus stiller und bewegter Zeit: Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben (Darmstadt, 1923), pp. 13-
16;  
55 James Pope-Hennessy, Queen Mary: the official biography (London, 2019 [1959), pp. 80-1.  
56 Gollwitzer, Die Standesherren, p. 63.  
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service, and the right to be judged by a jury of their own peers in criminal legal proceedings. 
Provisions for the management of their family estates carried the force of law and hereditary seats in 
state parliaments offered them the opportunity to influence law-making at state level. In Prussia, 
mediatised princes furthermore retained their church advowson, supervision over schools, and the 
right to appoint legal magistrates. True, the land-owning lower aristocracy, the Junkers, held on to 
many of the same patrimonial powers into the 1880s, ŵĂŬŝŶŐĞĂĐŚĞƐƚĂƚĞĂĨŽƌŵŝĚĂďůĞ ‘ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞůĂǁ
ƐƚĂƚĞ ?.57 Yet the superior status of the Standesherren was underlined by royal decrees issued in 1815 
and 1820, which entitled them to be included alongside the king in church prayers, to be addressed 
by their former titles, and to employ guards of honour, if they so wished. In light of these wide-
ranging privileges legal historians have suggested that until the 1848 revolution mediatised princes 
performed the functions of Unterlandesherren. The term resembles the ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐŽĨ ‘ƋƵĂƐŝ-
ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ?ƚŚĂƚĞŶƚŽŶƐĞĞƐĂƚǁŽƌŬŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĞŵƉŝƌĞƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĞƌĂƐƵƌĞŽĨůŽĐĂůƌƵůĞƌ ?Ɛ
effective sovereignty did not clear away conflict at the grassroots over the actual exercise of 
jurisdiction.58   
    Many mediatised princes were determined to defend their quasi-sovereign position. In 1813 they 
formed their own pressure group, the Association of the Mediatised, and during the deliberations 
about their future at the Congress of Vienna two years later Count Friedrich zu Solms-Laubach wrote 
to his clansman Prince Friedrich zu Solms-Braunfels:  ‘tĞĚŽŶŽƚǁĂŶƚƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞƐƵďũĞĐƚƐďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌ
peers-cum-clients (Schutzverwandte) [of the larger monarchies]; we would feel discomfited if our 
subjects were simply treated as numbers and the principle was thereby established that we and our 
                                                             
57 Note, though, that the powers of the Junkers were tied to ownership of a particular type of estate, the 
Rittergut, rather than inherited family privileges like mediatised princes. By 1855 only 55 percent of the 
Rittergütter iŶWƌƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĞĂƐƚĞƌŶƉƌŽǀŝŶĐĞƐƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚŝŶŶŽďůĞŚĂŶĚƐ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƚŚĂƚĂŐƌŽǁŝŶŐŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ
ĐŽŵŵŽŶĞƌƐǁĞƌĞĂƐƐƵŵŝŶŐƉĂƚƌŝŵŽŶŝĂůůŽƌĚƐŚŝƉ ?^ŚĞĂƌĞƌĂǀŝƐŽǁŵĂŶ ? ‘ŶƚĞďĞůůƵŵƉůĂŶƚĞƌƐĂŶĚsŽƌŵärz 
:ƵŶŬĞƌƐŝŶĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?American Historical Review 84:4 (1980), pp. 782, 787; John R. Gillis, 
 ‘ƌŝƐƚŽĐƌĂĐǇĂŶĚďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂĐǇŝŶŶŝŶĞƚĞĞŶƚŚ-ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇWƌƵƐƐŝĂ ? ?Past and Present 41 (1968), p. 113. See also 
Robert M. Berdahl, The politics of the Prussian nobility: the development of a conservative ideology, 1770-1848 
(Princeton, 1988); Heinz Reif, Adel, Aristokratie, Elite: Sozialgeschichte von Oben (Berlin, 2016), pp. 78-85; Jens 
EĞƵŵĂŶŶ ? ‘ĞƌĚĞůŝŵ ? ? ?Jahrhundert in DeutscŚůĂŶĚƵŶĚŶŐůĂŶĚŝŵsĞƌŐůĞŝĐŚ ? ?Geschichte und Gesellschaft 
30:1 (2004), pp. 173-5.    
58 Benton, A search for sovereignty, p. 256; Gottwald, Fürsten- und Staatsrecht, pp. 40-1. 
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people could be put on scales like ďŽŶĞƐĂŶĚďƵƚĐŚĞƌƐ ?ŵĞĂƚ ? ?59 Schutzverwandter was a telling 
choice of word, for it resurrected an early modern descriptor for individuals who enjoyed the 
protection of a polity without fully belonging to it.60 Although mediatised princes in Prussia had no 
choice but to accept the suzerainty of the Hohenzollerns after 1815, they ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƚŽĚŝƐƉůĂǇ ‘ƋƵĂƐŝ-
ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶ ? leadership in philanthropy for decades to come. Prince Otto zu Salm-Horstmar made a 
name for himself as founder-patron of the University of Münster and on a more modest scale his 
peers founded schools and supported causes ranging from art to historical associations. They also 
assumed the protectorate over various charities and patriotic organisations, while female members 
of mediatised families were known to provide resources for nursing and poor relief.61 /ŶƐŚŽƌƚ ? ‘ƚŚĞ
[former] high nobility of the Holy Roman Empire saw itself in a very Hobbesian sense as the 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚŐĞŶĞƌĂůǁĞůů-ďĞŝŶŐ ? ?ĂƐŽŶĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶŚĂƐƉƵƚŝƚ ?62     
   Small wonder, then, that decision-makers in Berlin were not opposed to a modicum of 
standesherrlich autonomy. The digestion of WƌƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůŐĂŝŶƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞEĂƉŽůĞŽŶŝĐtĂƌƐ 
 ?ĂďŽǀĞĂůůŽŶƚŚĞZŚŝŶĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂƚŝƐĞĚƉƌŝŶĐĞƐ ?ĞƐƚĂƚĞƐůĂǇ ) was a cumbersome task, 
and rather than impose laws and institutions from the East Elbian provinces, the central government 
preferred to leave decisions about local matters in the hands of those most directly affected. To that 
end consultative bodies for each province (Provinziallandtage) were established in 1823. The state 
ministry hoped that it could likewise rely on the Standesherren to aid the bureaucratic penetration of 
society, if properly co-opted. The crown prince, the future Friedrich Wilhelm IV, showed particular 
respect for an institution with deep historical roots in the community. At a meeting of the state 
                                                             
59 Count Solm-Laubach cited by Arthur Kleinschmidt, Geschichte von Arenberg, Salm und Leyen 1789-1815 
(Gotha, 1912), pp. 101-2.  
60 ^ĞĞƚŚĞĞŶƚƌǇĨŽƌ ‘^ĐŚƵƚǌ-Verwandte, Schutz-Genosse, Schirm-Verwandte oder Schirm-'ĞŶŽƐƐĞ ?^ĐŚƵƚǌůĞƵƚĞ ? ?
in Johann Heinrich Zedler, Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste (vol. 35, 
Leipzig, 1743), columns 1724-6. 
61 ,ĂŶƐũŽĂĐŚŝŵ,ĞŶŶŝŶŐ ? ‘ ?EŽďůĞƐƐĞŽďůŝŐĞ ? “&ƌĂŐĞŶǌƵŵĞŚƌĞŶĂŵƚůŝĐŚĞŶ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1870- ? ? ? ? ‘ ?Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 79 (1992), pp. 309-12.  
62 &ƌĂŶŬ:ƵŶŐ ? ‘DĞĚŝĂƚŝƐŝĞƌƵŶŐ ?<ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŝĞƌƵŶŐƵŶĚWĂƌůĂŵĞŶƚĂƌŝƐŝĞƌƵŶŐ PŝĞ^ĞůďƐƚŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŚĞƐƐŝƐĐŚĞƌ
Standesherren zwischen ůƚĞŶZĞŝĐŚƵŶĚEŽƌĚĚĞƵƚƐĐŚĞŵZĞŝĐŚƐƚĂŐ ? ?Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte 
58 (2008), pp. 99-100. 
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ministry in February 1838, he rejected a proposal to curb subjects ? oath of allegiance to their 
Standesherren because he considered this estate a valuable pillar of  ‘'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐĨĞƵĚĂů
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?63 He thus took it badly when the Frankfurt Parliament abolished the majority of 
ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝƐĞĚƉƌŝŶĐĞƐ ? seigneurial rights ten years later. Once the dust of the 1848/49 revolution had 
settled, he lobbied for restitution by reminding his ministers that he was Ă ‘ŵŽŶĂƌĐŚwho, thanks to a 
series of unfortunate events, has come to enjoy the fruits of an egregious theft from his [former] 
ƉĞĞƌƐŝŶƚŚĞ,ŽůǇZŽŵĂŶŵƉŝƌĞ ? ? 64 Previously, the victims of the  ‘ĞŐƌĞŐŝŽƵƐƚŚĞĨƚ ? had submitted a 
petition to the new national parliament in Frankfurt on 4 July 1848, in which they pilloried this 
injustice before going on to claim that even though financial settlements had remedied some of their 
grievances, the autonomy to govern their entailed estates and adopt binding constitutions for their 
dynasties could never be taken away from them. These rights were beyond the reach of  ‘state 
ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ?.65 Although the petitioners were implicitly conflating the legal person of the monarch 
and the state, which even royal ministers rejected, their spirited defence of the dynastic equality of 
mediatised and ruling houses naturally struck a chord with Friedrich Wilhelm IV.66 The upshot of the 
ŬŝŶŐ ?Ɛsympathy was once again the perpetuation of jurisdictional pluralism: on the one hand Prime 
Minister Otto von Manteuffel enacted reforms to replace the manorial courts of large landowners 
with regular ones throughout the 1850s, but at the same time the king restored mediatised princes 
to their privileged legal status and exemption from personal and property taxes.67   
   Incongruous as the existence of parallel jurisdictions may have seemed from a legal standpoint, 
Friedrich Wilhelm IV ?s solidarity with the Standesherren did serve a higher political purpose. Since 
                                                             
63 Protocol of the Ministry of State meeting on 20 February 1838, in Die Protokolle des Preußischen 
Staatsministeriums, (ed. Christina Rathgeber, vol. 2, Hildesheim, 2004), p. 274. 
64 Friedrich Wilhelm IV cited in Rolf Schier, Standesherren: Zur Auflösung der Adelsherrschaft in Deutschland 
1815-1918 (Heidelberg and Karlsruhe, 1978), p. 103. 
65 Wolfram Siemann, 1848/49 in Deutschland und Europa : Ereignis  W Bewältigung  W Erinnerung (Paderborn, 
2006), pp. 88-94. 
66 As Bismarck would go on to acknowledge when he became Prussian prime minister, the individuality of the 
ƐƚĂƚĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌƉŽƐĞ ?Ě ?ŝƚƐĞůĨďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?tŝŶĨƌŝĞĚZĂŶŬĞ ? ‘WƌĞƵßen  W ein KunststüĐŬ ? ?ŝŶ
Gottfried Korff (ed.), Preußen: Versuch einer Bilanz (Reinbek, 1981), p. 38. 
67 Anna Ross, Beyond the barricades: government and state-building in post-revolutionary Prussia, 1848-1858 
(Oxford, 2019) ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?ĞƵƐĐŚ ? ‘tĞƐƚĨäůŝƐĐŚĞ^ƚĂŶĚĞƐŚĞƌƌĞŶ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? 
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ƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐĐƌŽǁŶĞĚŚĞĂĚƐƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽƌĞ-consolidate their hold on power after the territorial re-
organisations of the Napoleonic Wars less by resurrecting rights that had supposedly been lost and 
more by convincing the public of their unbroken historic entitlements, as Volker Sellin notes, it would 
have undermined Friedrich WilhĞůŵ/s ?ƐĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇin his own eyes to deny the same courtesy to 
mediatised princes. 68 He was ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽǁŚĂƚĂǀŝĚĂƌĐůĂǇŚĂƐĐĂůůĞĚŚŝƐ ‘ŵŽŶĂƌĐŚŝĐĂůƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ? ?
which endeavoured to forge a sacral cult of monarchy supported by corporations like the 
Standesherren.69 dŚŝƐƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽĂ ‘ŶĞǁancien régime ?ĐŚŝŵĞĚǁŝƚŚthe time-honoured identification 
of sovereignty with local jurisdiction in German politico-legal thought. For example, Friedrich Carl von 
Savigny, a leading representative of the Historical School in the Pre-March Era, believed that gradual 
change based on indigenous common law was preferable to the uncertainties of rapid reform in the 
French Revolutionary style.70 ŶǇĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĂƐƐĞƌƚĂ ‘ŚŝŐŚĞƌƉŽǁĞƌƌĂŶĚŽŵůǇĂŶĚĐĂƉƌŝĐŝŽƵƐůǇŝŶ
disregard of the rights of others  W ďĞƚŚĞǇĐŚŝĞĨƚĂŝŶƐ ?ĂƌŝƐƚŽĐƌĂƚƐŽƌƚŚĞŵĂƐƐĞƐ ?ƌĂŶƚŚĞƌŝƐŬŽĨďĞŝŶŐ
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĚĞƐƉŽƚŝĐ ?^ĂǀŝŐŶǇ ?Ɛ former pupil, Bluntschli, warned. Fears about French-style 
 ‘ŵŽŶŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?ǁĞƌĞǁĞůů-established in the German lands since the period of French occupation. 71 
Even defenders of Roman Law could agree that a system premised on custom and the ancient 
corporate estates was more ŝŶƚƵŶĞǁŝƚŚĞŶƚƌĂůƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐƌŝĐŚŚĞƌŝtage of self-governing traditions.72  
   Of course, the integration of mediatised princes into the bureaucratic structure of the Prussian 
state was not free from friction. A notable bone of contention were the expectations of each party. 
The hope of some mediatised princes to retain their own administrations sat awkwardly with the role 
Berlin envisaged for them, which approximated the minor merum imperium of the Bodinian 
constitutional tradition as holders of limited executive powers delegated by the supreme sovereign, 
                                                             
68 Volker Sellin, Das Jahrhundert der Restaurationen: 1814 bis 1906 (Munich, 2014), introduction. 
69 Barclay, Frederick William IV and the Prussian monarchy, p. viii. 
70 Margaret Barber Crosby, The making of a German constitution: a slow revolution (Oxford, 2008), p. 83. The 
ƚĞƌŵ ‘ŶĞǁancien régime ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶďŽƌƌŽǁĞĚĨƌŽŵĂŝĂŶŝ ? ‘ZĞǀŝƐŝƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŶĐŝĞŶZĠŐŝŵĞŝŶƉost-Napoleonic 
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71 Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, Deutsches Staats-Wörterbuch (vol. 2, Stuttgart, 1857), p. 718; Bernsee, Moralische 
Erneuerung, p. 381. 
72 Barber, The making of a German constitution, pp. 36-8; James Q. Whitman, The Legacy of Roman Law in the 
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the king of Prussia.73 The ensuing negotiations often lasted for decades and necessitated 
compromises on both sides. Take the princes of Bentheim-Tecklenburg. In 1831, the crown and the 
Westphalian standesherrlich family reached an accord (Rezeß) whereby Prince Emil Friedrich 
recognised Prussian suzerainty and agreed to renounce all sovereign rights above and beyond the 
privileges granted in 1815 and 1820. By way of compensation he received an annual pension of 
12,000 thalers on top of authorisation to collect direct taxes for the upkeep of local magistrates and 
ŚŝƐŽǁŶ ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐĐŽƵŶĐŝů ? ?/ŶĂƐĞĐŽŶĚĂĐĐŽƌĚƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŚƌĞĞǇĞĂƌƐůĂƚĞƌƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐĞŐĂǀĞƵƉŚŝƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽ
collect taxes and his exemption from property tax in exchange for a further pension, yet the courts in 
Rheda and Limburg continued to dispense justice in his name. What is more, his successors clung to 
their dormant right to collect taxes.74 The Bentheim-Tecklenburgs were no exception. In the mid-
1820s, the princes of Wied and Solms-Braunfels concluded treaties of their own to set up 
standesherrlich administrations, which likewise exercised jurisdiction in local affairs without 
reference to Prussia, even if de facto they did so on behalf of the crown. It was only due to the 
significant expense of maintaining their own governments that mediatised princes  W including the 
houses of Wied and Solms-Braunfels  W could in subsequent years be ƉĞƌƐƵĂĚĞĚƚŽ ‘ƐĞůů ?ƚŚĞŝƌĞǆƚĂŶƚ
sovereign rights.75 
    Once again it pays to emphasise, though, that the quest for sovereignty was not a zero-sum game. 
On the contrary, the expansion of the Prussian state in successive waves of reform and conquest 
created opportunities for enterprising Standesherren to promote their dynastic interests while also 
serving the Hohenzollern monarchy. The remarkably similar career trajectories of the 
aforementioned Count Friedrich zu Solms-Laubach (1769-1822) and Count Otto zu Stolberg-
Wernigerode (1837-1896) showcase these hybrid allegiances well. Both grandees first rose to 
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prominence as advocates for the rights of their estate. Hailing from a large clan that claimed 
consanguinity with the house of Nassau and the Salic kings of the Middle Ages, Solms-Laubach 
succeeded to the presidency of the Association of the Mediatised in 1814 as a firm opponent of the 
 ‘ZŚĞŝŶďƵŶĚƵƐƵƌƉĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŚĂĚĐŽƐƚŚŝŵĂŶĚŚŝƐƉĞĞƌƐƚŚĞŝƌŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ?76 Thanks to his 
friendship with fellow Rhinelander, imperial baron and Prussian statesman Karl vom Stein, he 
managed to secure a seat on the Allied Central Administrative Department (1813/14), in which 
capacity he was responsible for assessing the debt the duchy of Nassau owed the Allied war effort 
against Napoleon. Not one to miss a chance for revenge on a monarch involved in the despoilment of 
his family earlier, Solms-Laubach returned with a figure the Nassowian government considered 
crippling, ĂŶĚǀŽǁĞĚƚŽ ‘ŚŽƵŶĚ ?ƚŚĞŵŝŶŽƌ'ĞƌŵĂŶƉƌŝŶĐĞƐƵŶƚŝůƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ŚĂŝƌƐ will stand ŽŶĞŶĚ ? ?77 
Although he was ultimately unsuccessful at reversing the subjection of mediatised prerogatives to 
the regulatory power of the Nassowian state, he became a trusted adviser to Prussian chancellor 
Prince Karl August von Hardenberg at the Congress of Vienna. Due to these connections but equally 
his standesherrlich pedigree, the former imperial count had himself appointed the first governor 
(Oberpräsident) of the new province of Jülich-Cleve-Berg in 1815.78 Since Solms-Laubach shared 
^ƚĞŝŶ ?ƐďĞůŝĞĨŝŶƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌĞĨŽƌŵĂƚƚŚĞůŽĐĂůůĞǀĞů ?ŚĞĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚůǇƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ
autonomy for the Rhineland, favoured the recruitment of locals for civil service positions and lobbied 
for the consultation of the population to keep Berlin abreast of regional issues.79                  
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Verfassungen auf dem Wiener Kongress 1814/15 ‘ ?Historische Zeitschrift, 217 (1973), pp. 303-4. 
78 August Klein, Friedrich Graf zu Solms-Laubach: Preußischer Oberpräsident in Köln (1815-1822) (Cologne, 
1936), p. 66. 
79 Michael Rowe, From Reich to state: the Rhineland in the Revolutionary Age, 1780-1830 (Cambridge, 2003); 
pp. 257-61; Jeffry M. Diefendorf, Businessmen and politics in the Rhineland, 1789-1834 (Princeton, NJ, 1980), p. 
 ? ? ? ?,ŽƌƐƚ>ĂĚĞŵĂĐŚĞƌ ? ‘ŝĞŶƂƌĚůŝĐŚĞŶZŚĞŝŶůĂŶĚĞǀŽŶĚĞƌRheinprovinz bis zur Bildung des 
Landschaftsverbandes Rheinland (1815- ? ? ? ? ) ? ?ŝŶ&ƌĂŶǌWĞƚƌŝĂŶĚ'ĞŽƌŐƌŽĞŐĞ ?ĞĚƐ ? ) ?Rheinische Geschichte 
(vol. 2, Düsseldorf, 1976), pp. 593-4. 
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    Although Stolberg-tĞƌŶŝŐĞƌŽĚĞ ?Ɛ family had ceded most of their sovereignty to the Prussian 
crown long before Napoleonic Wars, he, too, took great pride in the obligations of his heritage. The 
lowest courts (Friedensgerichte) and Protestant consistory in the county of Wernigerode acted on his 
behalf. Although subordinate to the Supreme Church Council in Berlin from 1850 onwards, it was 
understood that the superintendent of the consistory was a comital rather Prussian office holder. 
Royal decrees relating to spiritual matters only took effect in the county once the consistory had 
announced them separately to the population.80 Hence, being the sub-sovereign of Wernigerode was 
no sinecure. The later Prussian culture minister Robert Bosse, who started out in the service of 
another branch of the familǇ ?ƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚŚŝƐŵĂƐƚĞƌ ?ƐŚŝŐŚĞƐƚĞĞŵĨŽƌǇŽƵŶŐCount Otto ? ‘ĨƌŽŵǁŚŽŵ
the entire house of Stolberg expects great things for the defence of their rights and ƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?81 
Following the completion of a law degree and a two-year stint in the Prussian Gardes du corps, the 
count returned home to manage the family estates until the Austro-Prussian War, which saw him 
assume senior roles in wartime philanthropy for the care of the wounded and sick. Despite his 
relative lack of experience in public administration, Bismarck next chose him to be the first Prussian 
governor of the annexed kingdom of Hanover (1867-1873). A great uncle, Count Anton zu Stolberg-
Wernigerode, had served the Prussian state in the same role at the helm of the Province of Saxony 
thirty years before, and a cousin would become governor of Silesia shortly after KƚƚŽ ?ƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚ. 
Mindful of this family background, the minister-president calculated that the new Hanoverian 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŽƌ ?Ɛ lineage and the fact that he owned extensive property in the province would endear him 
to local aristocrats mourning the loss of the royal court.82 Although Guelph aristocrats proved rather 
harder to please than anticipated and formed the backbone of the anti-Prussian German Hanoverian 
Party into the twentieth century, Stolberg-Wernigerode pleased middle-class liberals by championing 
                                                             
80 Hans Seehase,  ‘ŝĞŝŶŐůŝĞĚĞƌƵŶŐǀŽŶ^ƚĂŶĚĞƐŚĞƌƌƐĐŚĂĨƚĞŶŝŶĚĂƐ<önigreich Preußen: Die Stolberger 
Grafschaften Stolberg-Stolberg, Stolberg-RoßůĂƵŶĚ^ƚŽůďĞƌŐtĞƌŶŝŐĞƌŽĚĞ ‘ ?ŝŶDĂŶĨƌĞĚtŝůĚĞĂŶĚManfred 
Seehase (eds.), Unter neuer Herrschaft: Konsequenzen des Wiener Kongresses (Leipzig, 2016), pp. 94-6. 
81 ZŽďĞƌƚŽƐƐĞ ? ‘&ƺƌƐƚKƚƚŽ zu Stolberg-Wernigerode ‘ ?Deutsche Revue, XVIII, part 2 (1903), p. 129. 
82 Stewart A. Stehlin, Bismarck and the Guelph Problem 1866-1890: a study in particularist opposition to 
national unity (The Hague, 1973), p. 177. 
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what Heide Barmeyer has called a  ‘ůŝďĞƌĂůƌĞĨŽƌŵŽĨƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?which coincided 
ǁŝƚŚŝƐŵĂƌĐŬ ?ƐŽǀĞƌĂůůƉůĂŶƚŽĚĞǀŽůǀĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌcertain social welfare and public works 
projects to the provinces.83   
   Solms->ĂƵďĂĐŚ ?ƐĂŶĚ^ƚŽůďĞƌŐ-tĞƌŶŝŐĞƌŽĚĞ ?s self-assured mediation between the interests of the 
state and the provinces made them a particular type of proconsul. Neither owed his position to 
meritocratic advancement through the Prussian civil service and they both poured scorn on the 
myopia of bureaucrats that came to the western provinces with notions of East Elbian superiority. 
Their primary legitimation came from their close relationship ǁŝƚŚWƌƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐƐƚĂƚĞƐŵĞŶ ?ǁŝƚŚ
whom they corresponded directly and whose policy directives they were expected to implement 
against local hostility. In that sense they conformed to the prototype of the colonial viceroy 
described by Jürgen Osterhammel:  ‘Ă specifically empowered personal envoy of the ruler, 
communicating with the monarch on a more intimate fooƚŝŶŐƚŚĂŶƚŚĞŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇŐŽǀĞƌŶŽƌ ? ?ǁŚŽƐĞ
vice-regal mandate is tŝĞĚƚŽ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƚĂƐŬƐŽĨŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůĐƌŝƐŝƐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ
 ‘ĚĞůĞŐĂƚĞĚŽŶĂƌĞŐƵůĂƌĂŶĚŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůďĂƐŝƐ ? ?84 In 1817 Solms-Laubach led a fronde of governors 
ǁŚŽƌĞĨƵƐĞĚƚŽƐƵďŵŝƚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ĐĞŶƐŽƌƐŚŝƉ ?ŽĨministerial civil servants because they insisted they 
were  ‘ĞŶǀŽǇƐŽĨƚŚĞĐƌŽǁŶ ? in the provinces.85 According to Rüdiger Schütz, ŐŽǀĞƌŶŽƌƐ ?ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞĂƐ 
Ă ‘ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞWƌƵƐƐŝĂŶĐŝǀŝůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞreflected an ambition to regulate, 
administer and decide provincial matters locally in consultation with the highest authorities in the 
land, the king and his ministers. WƌƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝǀĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůŐĂŝŶƐŝŶƚŚĞŶŝŶĞƚĞĞŶƚŚ century helped 
consolidate the autonomy of the governors, since growing diversity of the Hohenzollern state 
incentivised solutions that responded to 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐĨĞĚĞƌĂůŚĞƌŝƚĂŐĞ.86 This trend reached its apogee 
                                                             
83 ĂƌŵĞǇĞƌ ? ‘>ŝďĞƌĂůĞVerwaltungsreform als Mittel zur Eingliederung Hannovers in Preußen 1866- ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ ?ŝŶ
Peter Baumgart (ed.), Expansion und Integration: Zur Eingliederung neugewonnener Gebiete in den preußischen 
Staat (Cologne and Vienna, 1984), pp. 357-402. See also Stehlin, Bismarck and the Guelph Problem, pp. 176-84. 
84 :ƺƌŐĞŶKƐƚĞƌŚĂŵŵĞů ? ‘dŚĞŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůǀŝĐĞƌŽǇ PƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŶĂŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƚǇƉĞ ? ?ŝŶ:ĞƌŽĞŶƵŝĚĂŵĂŶĚ^ĂďŝŶĞ
Dabringhaus (eds.), The dynastic centre and the provinces: agents and interactions (Leiden, 2014), p. 23.  
85 ZƺĚŝŐĞƌ^ĐŚƺƚǌ ? ‘ŝĞƉƌĞƵßischen Oberpräsidenten 1815- ? ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶDie preußischen Oberpräsidenten 1815-
1945 (Boppard a. R., 1885), p. 69. 
86 Ibid., p. 71. 
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in Stolberg-tĞƌŶŝŐĞƌŽĚĞ ?ƐƚŝŵĞǁŝƚŚthe County Ordnance (Kreisordnung) of 1872, the Provincial 
Ordnance (Provinzialordnung) of 1875 and the Law on General State Administration (Gesetz über die 
allgemeine Landesverwaltung) of 1883.87  
    Solms-Laubach and Stolberg-Wernigerode participated prominently in the devolution of power out 
of a belief that their standesherrlich origins made them well-suited for the role of broker. The 
Hanoverian governor was quick to clarify in his memoirs that even though Prussia was his fatherland, 
ŚĞǁĂƐŶŽ ‘Prussian bigot ŽƌƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŝƐƚ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨŚŝƐĨĂŵŝůǇ ?Ɛwider roots in the history of the 
Holy Roman Empire.88 His biographer, Bosse, implied ŝŶĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌǀĞŝŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚ ?ƐĂŵŝĐĂďůĞ
treaty agreements with the Hohenzollern crown about the extant rights of his clan stemmed from a 
voluntary choice to serve Prussia.89 This cooperation was conditional, and Stolberg-Wernigerode 
therefore did not hesitate to fight back when he perceived his dynastic interests to be under threat. 
Two years after the Austro-Prussian War and in the middle of the treaty negotiations with Prussia, a 
senior official in his comital government, Rudolph Elvers, published a philippic against the 
 ‘ƐŵŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ?ůĞŐĂů ?ĂŶĚĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇďǇ ‘ƌƵƚŚůĞƐƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƵŶŝĨŽƌŵŝƚǇ ? in the 
name of state-building.90 Stolberg-Wernigerode ?ƐƐĐŚŝǌŽƉhrenic relations with Prussia are perhaps 
best summed up by the fact that while he held the governorship of Hanover, he also litigated against 
his employer to determine ownership of the Hanoverian county (Amt) of Elbingerode, which he laid 
claim to in his capacity as mediatised prince. 91 The revision of the Prussian county structure 
precipitated the absorption of his comital government into the Prussian state in 1876, but Stolberg-
                                                             
87 Georg-ŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚǀŽŶhŶƌƵŚ ? ‘Ğƌ preußische Oberpräsident  W ŶƚƐƚĞŚƵŶŐ ?^ƚĞůůƵŶŐƵŶĚtĂŶĚĞů ‘ ?ŝŶIbid., pp. 
25-7; Julian Wright and ChristophĞƌůĂƌŬ ? ‘ZĞŐŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚƚŚĞƐtate in France and Prussia ‘ ?European Review 
of History  W ZĞǀƵĞĞƵƌŽƉĠĞŶŶĞĚ ?ŚŝƐƚŽŝƌĞ15:3 (2008), pp. 277-93.  
88 Otto zu Stolberg Wernigerode, Die Lebenserinnerungen des Fürsten Otto zu Stolberg-Wernigerode (1837-
1896) (ed. Konrad Breitenborn, Wernigerode, 1996), p. 88. 
89 ŽƐƐĞ ? ‘&ürst Otto zu Stolberg-tĞƌŶŝŐĞƌŽĚĞ ? ?Ɖ ? 129.  
90 Rudolph Elvers, Die Stellung der deutschen Standesherren seit 1866: Nach den Forderungen des Rechts und 
der Politik (Berlin, 1868), pp. 4, 7. On the authorship of this anonymously published work, see Heinrich Heffter, 
Otto Fürst zu Stolberg-Wernigerode (Husum, 1980), p. 301. 
91 Ibid, p. 366. 
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tĞƌŶŝŐĞƌŽĚĞ ?ƐĐĂƌĞĞƌǁĂƐĨĂƌĨƌŽŵŽǀĞƌ ?ĨŽƌŚĞǁĂƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚvice-chancellor of Germany and vice-
premier of Prussia only two years later.     
   The complex and drawn-out negotiations with mediatised princes taught the Prussian crown 
lessons it could apply to the second category of dynasts under consideration, the monarchs deposed 
in 1866. Ironically, some of the same families that had profited from the Standesherren ?ƐĨĂůůĨƌŽŵ
power earlier would now find themselves on the receiving end.  
 
                                                                                        III 
 
The post-Napoleonic era was a period of intense state-building across the German Confederation. 
Governments aimed to mould the disparate populations that constituted the newly minted kingdoms 
of Bavaria or Hanover into integrated political communities. Their measure of success became the 
degree to which these semi-artificial entities managed to re-invent themselves as homelands of 
 ‘ŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?Žƌ ‘ƚƌŝďĞƐ ?ĨůŽƵƌŝƐŚŝŶŐƵnder the benign rule of  ‘ĂŶĐĞƐƚƌĂů ?ĚǇŶĂƐƚŝĞƐ ? 92 Although the 
sprawling Hohenzollern monarchy lent itself less easily to the propagation of a tribal identities, here, 
ƚŽŽ ?ĚŵƵŶĚƵƌŬĞ ?ƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞůĞƐƐŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚ Romantic 
intellectuals like the political economist Adam Müller to initiate a shift away from instrumental 
towards organic interpretations of the state, which found its guardian and spiritual embodiment in 
the monarch.93 The fusion of patriotism and dynasticism in such narratives of mutual attachment 
between the sovereign and his subjects bears testament ƚŽƚŚĞŐƌŽǁŝŶŐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ ‘ƐŽĨƚƉŽǁĞƌ ?in 
the projection of royal authority. In addition to traditional pillars of the monarchical principle like the 
                                                             
92 Frank Lorenz Müller, Royal heirs in Imperial Germany: the future of monarchy in nineteenth-century Bavaria, 
Saxony and Württemberg (Basingstoke, 2017), ch. 4; Abigail Green, Fatherlands: state-building and nationhood 
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ability to wield command over the army or the state bureaucracy, the rise of the mass media, the 
steady expansion of railway networks and consumer culture enabled monarchs to communicate with 
subjects more directly than ever before in pursuit of Untertanenliebe (love of subjects for their 
sovereign). 94  
   After five decades of particularist state-building, WƌƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛ annexation of Hanover, Hessen-Kassel 
and Nassau made it all the harder to settle the old debate whether and, if so, how allegiances could 
be transferred in the aftermath of regime change by force. Since the Final Act of the Vienna Congress 
ŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞĚƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶŽŶĨĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ĞƌůŝŶĨĂĐĞĚƚŚĞ
risk of foreign intervention on behalf of the wronged monarchs. Banking on this possibility, King 
'ĞŽƌŐsŽĨ,ĂŶŽǀĞƌŝƐƐƵĞĚĂƉƌŽƚĞƐƚŶŽƚĞƚŽĂůůƉŽǁĞƌƐ ‘ǁŚŽŚĂǀĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚƚŚĞƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇĂŶĚ
ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞŽĨŽƵƌŬŝŶŐĚŽŵ ?ĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁŝůůŶĞǀĞƌůĞƚŵŝŐŚƚƉƌĞǀĂŝůŽǀĞƌƌŝŐŚƚ ? ? The 
missive asserted ƚŚĞŬŝŶŐ ?ƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇĂŶĚĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚĂůůŽƌĚĞƌƐŝƐƐƵĞĚďǇƚŚĞ,ŽŚĞŶǌŽůůĞƌŶ
 ‘ƵƐƵƌƉĞƌ ?ǀŽŝĚ ?95 The Prussian authorities were well aware of the moral predicament 'ĞŽƌŐs ?Ɛ
obstinacy placed his subjects in. In a revealing letter  W one of many received in the first year of 
Prussian rule  W the mayor of Norden in East Frisia defended himself to a superior thus P ‘zŽƵƌ
Excellency knows better than me that loyalty and love of country are not to be found where people 
change kings like coats. Those Hanoverians that remained faithful to King Georg V when his star 
began to wane will on the grounds of the same ethical necessity be hailed as the best Prussians one 
ĚĂǇ ? ?96      
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95 Georg V, Der Protest des Königs von Hannover gerichtet an die europäischen Mächte gegen die Einverleibung 
seines Landes durch den König von Preußen (n. p., 1866), pp. 13-4. 
96 Mayor Taaks to Civil Commissioner Freiherr Hans von Hardenberg, 19 August 1866, Niedersächsisches 
Hauptstaatsarchiv Hannover (hereafter NHStAH), Hann. 116 Nr 14/I. 
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    Mayor Johann Hillern Taaks of Norden was one of the many civil servants and officers in the 
occupied territories that were waiting to be released from the oath of allegiance to their former 
sovereigns. Friedrich Wilhelm I of Hessen-Kassel and Adolph of Nassau issued the necessary 
instructions soon after the annexations became formalised, as did Georg V with some delay in 
December 1866. Defiance would have achieved little except to endanger the careers of their 
subordinates and to jeopardise the return of family assets seized by Prussia. They were handsomely 
compensated for their sacrifice, however. The Treaty of Stettin guaranteed the elector the continued 
payment of his civil list to the value of 300,000 thalers annually (minus deductions for administrative 
expenses) while Duke Adolph and Georg V received the dividends of 8.9 and 16 million thalers 
respectively invested in Prussian 4.5 percent stocks and securities. In addition, the three former 
rulers had estates and palaces returned to them. These generous terms provided for a comfortable 
existence in exile, which permitted Duke Adolph, hitherto the ruler over less than half a million 
subjects, to maintain a household of 140 court officials and servants.97    
   ƚĨŝƌƐƚŐůĂŶĐĞƚŚĞĚĞƉŽƐĞĚŵŽŶĂƌĐŚƐ ?ƚƌĂĚĞŽĨƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƌŝŐŚƚƐĨŽƌŵŽŶĞǇĐŽŶĨŽƌŵĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƉĂƚŚ
chosen by many Standesherren. Indeed, this is how Queen Victoria, who had initiated the 
ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞWƌƵƐƐŝĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽŶ'ĞŽƌŐs ?ƐďĞŚĂůĨ ?ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚǁŚĞŶ
ƐŚĞĂƐƐƵƌĞĚŝƐŵĂƌĐŬƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŬŝŶŐ ?ƐĂĐĐĞƉƚĂnce of money from Berlin would make him honour-
bound not to interfere in Hanover.98 tŝůŚĞůŵŽĨWƌƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐƐĞŶŝŽƌĂĚǀŝƐĞƌƐŵĂĚĞŵƵĐŚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƉŽŝŶƚ
in their recommendation to approve the treaty. The fact that the exchange of subjects for cash flew 
in the face of the supposedly unique congruity between dynastic, ethno-tribal and territorial 
identities so cherished by state-builders raised few hackles because the reduction of sovereignty to 
an alienable commodity allowed for easier transfer. Hence, no sooner had Elector Friedrich Wilhelm I 
put his name to the Stettin Treaty than WilhĞůŵ ‘ŐŝĨƚĞĚ ?ƚŚĞĨorest of Schmalkalden  W until then an 
                                                             
97 WŝĞƌƌĞǀĞŶ ? ‘ĚŽůƉŚ ?,ĞƌǌŽŐǌƵEĂƐƐĂƵ ?'ƌŽƘŚĞƌǌŽŐǀŽŶ>ƵǆĞŵďƵƌŐ PŝŶ>ĞďĞŶƐďŝůĚ ? ?ŝŶ,ĞƐƐŝƐĐŚĞ
Landesbibliothek Wiesbaden (ed.), Adolph Herzog zu Nassau Großherzog von Luxemburg 1817-1905 
(Wiesbaden, 1992), p. 49. 
98 Stehlin, Bismarck and the Guelph Problem, p. 52. 
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exclave of Hessen-Kassel  W to the duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha for his military assistance during the 
war of 1866.99 Friedrich Wilhelm I and Georg V were not too perturbed, though, since they 
considered the release of their subjects from the oath of allegiance merely a temporary setback. 
Without the hard power of the state behind them, they counted on the conscience of their subjects 
to leave the door open for a comeback. In a public statement the elector lectured the population of 
Hessen-Kassel that although oath-takers were henceforth ĨƌĞĞƚŽĨŽůůŽǁƚŚĞWƌƵƐƐŝĂŶŬŝŶŐ ?Ɛ
ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ƚŚĂƚďŽƵŶĚƚŚĞŵƚŽƚŚĞŝƌ former sovereign was permanent.  
Every servant of the state therefore had to decide for himself whether to commit an act of 
 ‘ĚŝƐůŽǇĂůƚǇ ? ?Treuverletzung).100 Georg V adopted a similar logic by asking his officers to request their 
release from the oath of allegiance individually. He hoped their personal bond could be re-activated 
once popular acclamation or foreign intervention had put him back on the ancestral throne.101   
   There existed international precedents for such conceptions of loyalty. The Hanoverian and Hessian 
ŵŽŶĂƌĐŚƐ ? voluntarist interpretation of the subject-sovereign dyad converged in some important 
respects with the discourse of subjecthood in the British Empire prior to the American Revolution. 
Growing out of the Bodinian credo ƚŚĂƚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉĞŶƚĂŝůĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ƐƵďŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚŽďĞĚŝĞŶĐĞŽĨĂĨƌĞĞ
                                                             
99 Donation reprinted in Wilhelm Hopf (ed.), Die deutsche Krisis des Jahres 1866 (Hanover, 1906), p. 387; Max 
Endres, Handbuch der Forstpolitik mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Gesetzgebung und Statistik (Berlin, 
1922, 2nd edn.), pp. 415-6. On the idea of sovereignty as royal property (which fell into increasing abeyance in 
the course of the nineteenth century), see Herbert H. Rowen, dŚĞŬŝŶŐ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞ PƉƌŽƉƌŝĞƚĂƌǇĚǇŶĂƐƚŝĐŝƐŵŝŶĞĂƌůǇ
modern France (New Brunswick, 1980); Rafe Blaufarb, The great demarcation: The French Revolution and the 
invention of modern property (Oxford, 2016); Karl Möckl ? ‘ĞƌĚĞƵƚƐĐŚĞĚĞůƵŶĚĚŝĞĨƺƌƐƚůŝĐŚ-monarchischen 
Höfe 1750- ? ? ? ? ? ?Geschichte und Gesellschaft Sonderheft 13 (1990), p. 101. 
100 Friedrich Wilhelm I von Hessen-Kassel, Denkschrift Sr. Königlichen Hoheit des Kurfürsten Friedrich Wilhelm I. 
Von Hessen, betreffend die Auflösung des Deutschen Bundes und die Usurpation des Kurfürstenthums durch die 
Krone Preußens im Jahre 1866 (Prague, 1868), pp. 60-1. 
101 'ĞŽƌŐs ?ƐĂĚũƵƚĂŶƚŐĞŶĞƌĂů ?ŽůŽŶĞů'ĞŽƌŐĂŵŵĞƌƐ ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŝŶŚŝƐŵĞŵŽŝƌƐŚŽǁŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐĚĞĂůƚǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐ
chaůůĞŶŐĞ P ‘tŚĞŶƚŚĞƚŝŵĞĐĂŵĞƚŽƚĂŬĞŵǇůĞĂǀĞ/ǁĂƐŶĂƚƵƌĂůůǇǀĞƌǇŵŽǀĞĚĂŶĚĂƐƐƵƌĞĚ ?ƚŚĞŬŝŶŐ ?ŽĨŵǇ
lasting loyalty. I told him I was saying goodbye with the deepest sorrow but understood entirely that he did not 
need my services at present. Should they bĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚĂŐĂŝŶŝŶĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?/ǁŽƵůĚďĞĂƚŚŝƐĚŝƐƉŽƐĂů ? ?Georg F. 
Dammers, Erinnerungen und Erlebnisse des königlich hannoverschen General-Major Georg Friedrich Ferdinand 
Dammers, letztem General-Adjutanten des Königs Georg V. von Hannover (Hanover, 1890), p. 177. On the oath 
of allegiance and the political instrumentalisation of loyalty more generally, see Robert Bernsee, Moralische 
Erneuerung: Korruption und bürokratische Reformen in Bayern und Preußen, 1780-1820 (Göttingen, 2017), pp. 
176-83; Nikolaus Buschmann and Karl Borromäus Murr (eds.), Treue: Politische Loyalität und militärische 
Gefolgschaft in der Moderne (Göttingen, 2007); Sven Lange, Der Fahneneid: Die Geschichte der 
Schwurverpflichtung im deutschen Militär (Bremen, 2002). 
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ƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽŚŝƐƉƌŝŶĐĞ ? ?it established a deeply personal relationship to the monarch as individuals 
ĂĐƌŽƐƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨĂƌ-flung colonies proclaimed their allegiance to the crown and laid claim to a 
corresponding set of protections.102 A not entirely dissimilar process of claims-making underlay 
subjecthood in mid-nineteenth century Germany. Although monarchs in exile no longer had the 
wherewithal to intervene on behalf of subjects openly, their informal influence with loyal followers, 
donations to ĐŚĂƌŝƚŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ŚŽŵĞůĂŶĚ ? and, in the case of Georg V, patronage of anti-Prussian 
organisations such as the infamous Guelph Legion in France or the German Hanoverian Party were 
designed to convince legitimists that they were fighting the good fight for the independence of their 
people. The Hohenzollerns therefore remained concerned for a long time about individuals like the 
Standesherr Prince Ludwig Wilhelm zu Bentheim, who outwardly accepted the new regime to 
continue their military or civil service careers but secretly professed a personal attachment to Georg 
s ?ƚŚĞ ‘ŬŝŶŐŽĨŚŝƐŚĞĂƌƚ ?.103 Put another way, the annexations of 1866 made the absent sovereign not 
only a political point of orientation for critics of the Prussian state but also forced supporters of 
Hohenzollern rule to adjust their way of thinking, even if only to discredit the former.104  
   The debates which ensued in the Prussian parliament, the Landtag, are a case in point. Despite the 
confident assertion by Ernst Rudolf Huber, one of the doyens of modern German constitutional 
history, that debellatio offered sufficient cause for the incorporation of Hanover, Hesse-Kassel, 
Nassau and the city of Frankfurt into Prussia, the sub-committee tasked with the preparation of the 
bill apparently felt less sure because it advised the government to  ‘ĨŝŶĚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌůĞŐĂůũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
than [the right of] conquest. It amounts to naked coercion, which does no longer suffice for law- and 
                                                             
102 Hannah Weiss Muller, Subjects and sovereign: bonds of belonging in the eighteenth-century British Empire 
(Oxford, 2017), p. 9, 212-19. 
103 Ludwig Prince von Bentheim to King George V, 13 March 1867, NStAH, Dep. 103, V, 455. 
104 Riotte, Der Monarch im Exil. Cf. Frank BöƐĐŚ ? ‘ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂƚƚŚĞĐĞŶƚĞƌ PƚŚĞĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƐŝŶ>ŽǁĞƌ^ĂǆŽŶǇ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ<ĂŝƐĞƌƌĞŝĐŚĂŶĚ&ĞĚĞƌĂůZĞƉƵďůŝĐ ? ?ŝŶEĞŝů'ƌĞŐŽƌ ?EŝůƐZŽĞŵĞƌĂŶĚDĂƌŬZŽƐĞŵĂŶ ?ĞĚƐ ? ) ?German 
history from the margins (Bloomington, IN, 2006), pp. 127- ? ? ?ƌŶƐƚ^ĐŚƵďĞƌƚ ? ‘Verdeckte Opposition in der 
WƌŽǀŝŶǌ,ĂŶŶŽǀĞƌ PĞƌ<ĂŵƉĨĚĞƌ “tĞůĨĞŶ ?ƵŵĚŝĞƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĞ/ĚĞŶƚŝƚćƚǁćŚƌĞŶĚĚĞƐ<ĂŝƐĞƌƌĞŝĐŚƐ ? ?Blätter für 
deutsche Landesgeschichte, 134 (1998), pp. 211-72; Hans-Georg Aschoff, Welfische Bewegung und politischer 
Katholizismus 1866-1918 (Düsseldorf, 1987).       
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state-building in ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŝŵĞ ? ?105 At least Bluntschli was prepared to ĐŽƵŶƚĞŶĂŶĐĞ ‘ĚĞƐƉŽƚŝĐĂĐƚƐ ? 
if public necessity called for it, though such a case was difficult to make for straight-up conquest 
because Prussia did not even adopt a law for the expropriation of private property in the common 
interest until 1874.106 The Heidelberg professor therefore resorted to a higher justification, namely 
the will of ƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶƚŽďĞƵŶŝƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚǁĂƌŶĞĚƚŚĂƚƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞ ‘ĨƌĞĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶ ?Śad been] 
ŚĞŵŵĞĚŝŶĂŶĚůĞĚĚŽǁŶƚŚĞŐĂƌĚĞŶƉĂƚŚďǇĚǇŶĂƐƚŝĐůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ?ĨŽƌƚŽŽůŽŶŐ ?WƌƵƐƐŝĂƐŚŽƵůĚ
ĂďĂŶĚŽŶŚĞƌŽǁŶ ‘ƐƵƉĞƌƐƚŝƚŝŽƵƐŝŶĨĂƚƵĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ? ?107 WƌƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƉƌesident, Otto von 
Bismarck, readily ĂĚŽƉƚĞĚůƵŶƚƐĐŚůŝ ?ƐůŝŶĞŽĨƌĞĂƐŽŶŝng to defend the annexations.108 In so doing he 
could rely on the emerging popularity of Realpolitik, a new system of thought inspired by Charles 
ĂƌǁŝŶ ?ƐĞǀŽůƵƚŝonary theory, which held that assertiveness rather than morals, rights or respect for 
historical precedent was the key to national survival.109  
   To lend weight to the claim that conquest was in the national interest, Bismarck had to make the 
people, as represented by the Landtag, the arbiter of the settlements between the Prussian crown 
and the deposed princes. However, historians have often marvelled why Bismarck had parliament 
vote on the agreements in February 1868 ?ŽŶůǇƚŽƐĞƋƵĞƐƚĞƌ'ĞŽƌŐs ?ƐĂŶĚ&ƌŝĞĚƌŝĐŚtŝůŚĞůŵ/ ?Ɛ
assets one month later. The two most prominent explanations are that he either acted out of 
genuine disappointment about ƚŚĞƚǁŽŵŽŶĂƌĐŚƐ ?unabated enmity towards Prussia or that he 
wanted to secure a slush fund free from parliamentary control. However, both answers miss an 
important detail: Bismarck sought parliamentary confirmation for all major measures regarding the 
                                                             
105 Ernst Rudolf Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789 (vol. 3, Stuttgart, 19782), pp. 580-1; Stephan 
sĞƌŽƐƚĂ ? ‘ŝĞsƂůŬĞƌƌĞĐŚƚƐǁŝĚƌŝŐŬĞŝƚĚĞƌŶŶĞǆŝŽŶ,ĂŶŶŽǀĞƌƐĚƵƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶŝĞƚĞƌůƵŵĞŶǁŝƚǌĂŶĚůďƌĞĐŚƚ
Randelzhofer, eds, Festschrift für Friedrich Berber zum 75. Geburtstag (Munich, 1973), p. 530. 
106 Bluntschli, Deutsches Staats-Wörterbuch, p. 718; Lars Menninger, Die Inanspruchnahme Privater durch den 
Staat: Das Recht der Aufopferung und Enteignung im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert (Baden-Baden, 2014), p. 142. 
107 Bluntschli, Denkwürdiges aus meinem Leben (vol. 3, Nordlingen, 1884), p. 32. 
108 Otto von Bismarck, Bismarck, the man and the statesman (tr. Arthur John Butler, vol. 2, New York, 1898), pp. 
79-80. 
109 Johannes Paulmann, Globale Vorherrschaft und Fortschritt: Europa 1850-1914 (Munich, 2019), pp. 368-78; 
Karl-'ĞŽƌŐ&ĂďĞƌ ? ‘ZĞĂůƉŽůŝƚŝŬĂůƐ/ĚĞŽůŽŐŝĞ PŝĞĞĚĞƵƚƵŶŐĚĞƐ:ĂŚƌĞƐ ? ? ? ?Ĩür das politische Denken in 
ĞƵƚƐĐŚůĂŶĚ ? ?Historische Zeitschrift 203 (1966), pp. 1-45.   
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exiled dynasties and did the same for treaties concluded with Standesherren since 1869. 110 Although 
this move strengthened the Prussian legislature, the legal counsel of Duke Engelbert-August von 
Arenberg was probably right to suspect that Bismarck considered this an acceptable price to pay for 
the opportunity to hide behind the Landtag as he dispossessed his ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶ ?ƐƉĞĞƌƐ.111 Attentive to 
the legitimatory force of public opinion, the conservative jurist Carl Ludwig von Haller had warned as 
early as 1820 that only treaties which could count on broad backing guaranteed ƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŵƉůĞƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨ
conquest.112    
   The common front of the Prussian crown and parliament against rival claimants of sovereignty 
gathered further momentum as the unified Kaiserreich took shape after 1871. With the dissolution of 
the German Confederation the mediatised princes had lost the protection of their vestigial sovereign 
rights under international law, and the Reichstag took full advantage of this to pass legislation which 
gradually standardised German citizenship over the next four decades, culminating in the Civil Code 
of 1900. dŚĞWƌƵƐƐŝĂŶĐƌŽǁŶĂůƐŽƐĐŽƌĞĚĂǀŝĐƚŽƌǇǁŚĞŶůĞĐƚŽƌ&ƌŝĞĚƌŝĐŚtŝůŚĞůŵ/ ?ƐŚĞŝƌ
acknowledged the incorporation of ŚŝƐƉĂƚƌŝŵŽŶǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ,ŽŚĞŶǌŽůůĞƌŶŵŽŶĂƌĐŚǇĂƐĂŶ ‘ŝƌƌĞǀŽĐĂďůĞ
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĂĐƚ ?in return for an increase of the dividends payable to the beneficiaries of the 
ƌĂďĂŶƚĚǇŶĂƐƚǇ ?ƐĞŶƚĂŝůĞĚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƐĞƋƵĞƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŚĂĚŝŶƚŚĞŵĞĂŶƚŝŵĞďĞĞŶůŝĨƚĞĚ ).113 
Eventually even relations with ƚŚĞWƌƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŽǇĂůĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐŵŽƐƚƐƚĞĂĚĨĂƐƚĐƌŝƚŝĐƐ, the Guelphs, 
mellowed. In 1892 their sequestrated property was returned to them, clearing the path for the 
ďĞƚƌŽƚŚĂůŽĨƚŚĞ'ƵĞůƉŚŚĞŝƌƚŽ<ĂŝƐĞƌtŝůŚĞůŵ// ?ƐŽŶůǇĚĂƵŐŚƚĞƌ ĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽƵƉůĞ ?ƐĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ
ducal throne of Brunswick in 1913.114 /ŶƚƌŝŐƵŝŶŐůǇ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞĚĞĐůŝŶĞŽĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐĚĞƚŚƌŽŶĞĚ
sovereigns as a political threat to Hohenzollern legitimacy coincided with an upgrading of their 
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111 Heinrich Zoepfl, Rechtsgutachten über die von der Königlich-Preußischen Staatsregierung beabsichtigte neue 
gesetzliche Regulirung des standesherrlichen Rechtszustandes des Herzogs von Arenberg wegen des 
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112 Carl Ludwig von Haller, Restauration der Staats-Wissenschaft oder Theorie des natürlich-geselligen Zustands 
der Chimäre des künstlich-bürgerlichen entgegengesetzt (vol. 2, Winterthur, 1820), p. 543. 
113 Treaty reprinted in Hopf (ed.), Die deutsche Krisis, pp. 391-2. 
114 Cf. Ute Daniel and Christian K. Frey (eds.), Die preußisch-welfische Hochzeit 1913 (Brunswick, 2016). 
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symbolic prestige through titles and ceremonial privileges. Wilhelm II courted the indifferent 
Hanoverian Standesherr Duke Engelbert-Maria von Arenberg with some success and elevated several 
princely families to higher peerages (including the Stolberg-Wernigerodes).115 After 1900 the Kaiser 
similarly assumed the co-protectorate of various commemorative projects alongside the Hanoverian 
and Nassowian royal families to burnish his image as a ĚĞĨĞŶĚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞĂŶŶĞǆĞĚƉƌŽǀŝŶĐĞƐ ? 
heritage.116 The elaborateness of this pageantry bore witness to the monarchy-centred nature of 
German politics between 1815 and the First World War, but at the same time the involvement of 
multiple dynasties offers one final reminder that the symbolic capital of deposed princes could be 
useful where overt markers of sovereignty like the exercise of physical control over a given territory, 
the ability to make laws or the acquiescence of the international community were insufficient on 
their own to ensure ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛidentification with the official head of state.  
 
                                                                                    IV 
Conquest and subjugation are potent drivers of history. The French philosopher Grégoire Chamayou 
has called this will to dominate  ‘ĐǇŶĞgetic energy ? because ŝƚ ‘ŐĂƚŚĞƌƐtogether what is scattered, 
ĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝǌĞƐĂŶĚĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚĞƐŝŶĂůŝŵŝƚůĞƐƐůŽŐŝĐŽĨĂŶŶĞǆĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?117 The phenomenon Chamayou 
describes is a common trope in the literature on the birth of the modern state: the creation of 
standing armies and the expansion of bureaucratic infrastructures put governments in a position to 
bring rival bearers of jurisdiction under their control and, where possible, to eliminate them. Legal 
codes became standardised and, in time, the state gained legal personality distinct from the 
sovereignty of the ruler.118 The late nineteenth-century German sociologist Max Weber famously 
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Grimm, Constitutionalism: past, present, and future  ?KǆĨŽƌĚ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?tŽůĨŐĂŶŐZĞŝŶŚĂƌĚ ? ‘ĂƐtĂĐŚƐƚƵŵ
ĚĞƌ^ƚĂĂƚƐŐĞǁĂůƚ P,ŝƐƚŽƌŝƐĐŚĞZĞĨůĞǆŝŽŶĞŶ ? ?Der Staat,  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?ŶĚƌĞĂƐWĞēĂƌ ? ‘ǇŶĂƐƚŝĞŶ W Träger der 
Staatsbildung? Überlegungen zu Herrschaft und Staatsbildung in kulturvergleichender Perspektive anlässlich 
ĞŝŶĞƌƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚĞŶEĞƵĞƌƐĐŚĞŝŶƵŶŐ ‘ ?Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung, 44 (2017), pp. 51-67. As Bridget 
ŽŐŐŝŶƐ ?ƐƵĐĐŝŶĐƚƐƵŵŵĂƌǇŽĨthe quantitative evidence gathered by the Correlates of War Project highlights, 
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coined the phrase  ‘ƚŚĞĚŝƐĞŶĐŚĂŶƚŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ this relentless onslaught of 
rationalisation and standardisation.119 ƐƚŚĞŵĞůĂŶĐŚŽůŝĐƵŶĚĞƌƚŽŶĞŽĨtĞďĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ?
however, he felt that something important was being lost in the process, for the disappearance of 
ancient institutions and customs raised uncomfortable questions about the direction of the future.  
   This article has explored Prussian state-building from the rather less familiar angle of the 
ǀĂŶƋƵŝƐŚĞĚ ‘ǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ ? ?It has argued that for much of the nineteenth century sovereignty remained a 
contested resource due to the difficult political, legal and ethical implications of conquest, the 
reluctance of former elites to part with their sovereignty, and the services that Unterlandesherren 
could render the state. To be more precise, the dispossession of fellow dynasts threatened to 
undermine the fiction of historical continuity that lay at the heart of the monarchical principle and 
accounts for the eagerness of successive generations of Prussian monarchs to win the acquiescence 
of their defeated peers through treaties and symbolic acts of reconciliation. Conquest moreover 
evoked negative memories of the Napoleonic Wars, which is why pro-Prussian legal minds like 
Brockhaus and Bluntschli had to go to considerable lengths to justify it. Finally, while it may have 
been true in a very broad sense, as RichĂƌĚ: ?ǀĂŶƐǁƌŝƚĞƐ ?ƚŚĂƚĂĨƚĞƌ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŝŶĐĞŽƌƌƵůĞƌ
became, in effect, the executor of national or state sovereignty guaranteed by international 
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǀŝƌƚƵĂůĨŽƌĐĞŽĨůĂǁ ? ?ƚŚĞĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůĐhanges caused by the 
Napoleonic Wars meant that the Prussian monarchy for a long time lacked the means to carry its will 
into effect locally.120 Dynasties with deep roots in the community were better placed to transmit a 
 ‘ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝǌĞĚĂŶĚŝŶƚŝŵĂƚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ? (to borrow Frank Mort ?ƐĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ), which created 
an opening for them to stay relevant in a century of dramatic sea-changes.121 The interplay of all the 
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119 Max WĞďĞƌ ? ‘dŚĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ‘ ?ŝŶtĞďĞƌ ?Political writings (ed. Peter Lassman and 
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lĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶ^ƚĞƉŚĞŶdƵƌŶĞƌ ?ĞĚ ? ) ?The Cambridge companion to Weber (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 96-7. 
120 Richard J. Evans, The pursuit of power: Europe 1815-1914 (London, 2016), p. 28. 
121 &ƌĂŶŬDŽƌƚ ? ‘^ĂĨĞĨŽƌĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ PĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ƉŽƉƵůĂƌƐƉĞĐƚĂĐůĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŵŽŶĂƌĐŚǇ ? ? ? ? ?-
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above strands makes clear that in practice sovereignty was never a unitary concept, even in a system 
ůŝŬĞWƌƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛwhere the defenders of the monarchical principle held fast to the Bodinian tradition. As 
a result, Prussian state-building was replete with jurisdictional ambiguities and reversals of fortune, 
thanks to which fallen potentates managed to preserve and sometimes even to claw back attributes 
of sovereignty. As late as October 1870 King Wilhelm I and his ministers postponed a decision on 
whether Count Otto zu Stolberg-Wernigerode should be permitted to keep his comital government 
(Regierung) and approve charitable donations in his domains in lieu of the king.122    
    This ĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶWƌƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐŬŝŶŐƐ ?ƋƵĂƐŝ-sovereigns and absent monarchs tells a 
global story. Many polities  W and in the nineteenth century most were still presided over by 
monarchs of some description  W competed with other monarchies for people, land, influence 
resources. In a ƚǁŝƐƚŽŶƚŚĞ,ŽďďĞƐŝĂŶƐƚĂƚĞŽĨŶĂƚƵƌĞƚŚŝƐŵĂĚĞŬŝŶŐƐĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐǁŽůĨ ?rex regi 
lupus).  ‘ĨƌŝĐĂŶŽŶĂƉĂƌƚĞƐ ?ůŝŬĞƚŚĞEǇĂŵǁĞǌŝĐŚŝĞĨDďƵůĂDƚǇĞůĂŽƌƚŚĞĨĂŵĞĚƵůƵŬŝŶŐ^ŚĂŬĂ 
participated in this game of mutual elimination just as much as European monarchs that inflicted a 
slow death of dismemberment on the once mighty Ottoman Empire.123 Yet superior strength did not 
automatically confer full sovereignty on the new occupant of a conquered territory. ŵŽŶŐ ‘ĐŝǀŝůŝƐĞĚ
nationƐ ? ?ĐƵƐƚŽŵĂƌǇůĂǁ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĞĐůŽƵƚŽĨ ‘ŝŶĚŝŐĞŶŽƵƐŝŶƚĞƌŵĞĚŝĂƌŝĞƐ ? ?ƚŚĞ
political will of the international community and public opinion came together in a spectrum of 
possible outcomes, which stretched from outright annexation to the establishment of protectorates 
and the sharing of jurisdiction within condominia. The brutality unleashed by wars of conquest in and 
outside Europe make it easy to overlook those subtle in-between solutions. Some historians rightly 
stress that while conquerors have come and gone, political experiments with divided sovereignty 
have proved remarkably durable, if not to say successful. Condominia have been an attractive model 
of political organisation for at least two-and-a-half millennia because of their ability to make rivals 
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work with rather than against each other.124 In an undisguised nod to the travails of Brexit, Beatrice 
Heuser comes to similar conclusions about federal unions P ‘ŽŶĞƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƐĂďƐŽůƵƚĞƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇŝƐ 
ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĂďƐŽůƵƚĞŝŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚŽŶĞƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƐƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĂƚƚĂĐŬŝƚ ?EĞŝƚŚĞƌĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƐƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?
Sovereignty, and that is the lesson of the Holy Roman Empire, can instead be shared at several levels. 
Subsidiarity  W the principle that decisions should be made at the lowest level possible  W was widely 
practised even there. ?125 The contestation and negotiation of the monarchical principle in Prussia 
between  ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?ŚĂƐƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞĨŽƌ,ĞƵƐĞƌ ?Ɛ poignant statement. The world German kings and 
statesmen ŝŶŚĂďŝƚĞĚĂĨƚĞƌEĂƉŽůĞŽŶ ?ƐĨĂůůƐƚŝůůƌĞůŝĞĚŽŶƚŚĞmultilateral frameworks of the Holy 
Roman Empire for orientation, but at the same time these actors were not immune to new notions 
of national sovereignty, which served to centralise power in the hands of a few. Like governments 
today, they faced a political crossroads at which the future could turn either way.       
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